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ABSTRACT 
Purpose. As the aged population of this country grows, the U.S. healthcare system will 
face increased pressure to provide long-term care services and supports to increasing 
numbers of elderly Medicare beneficiaries. Studies have indicated that unmet long-term 
care need can lead to increased, unnecessary utilization of the healthcare system, thus 
further taxing the Medicare system. Little is known about how type of long-term care, as 
well as how long-term care policies—specifically payment policies—affect health care 
utilization. The objective of this original dissertation research was to examine the effects 
of place of residence (community versus residential long-term care facility) and long-
term care payer type (private pay versus Medicaid) on Medicare-funded healthcare 
utilization in terms of both risk of potentially preventable hospitalization (PPH) and 
Medicare expenditures.  
Methods. This study utilized data from the 5% sample of 2013 Medicare claims and 
enrollment data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) merged 
with data from the Areas Health Resource File (AHRF). A retrospective cohort analysis 
examined the healthcare utilization and expenditure patterns of Medicare beneficiaries for 
whom, based on clinical and demographic factors, the provision of formal, 
comprehensive long-term care would be appropriate, among four cohorts: Medicare-only 
beneficiaries residing in the community; Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in long-
term care facilities; Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the 
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community; and Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care 
facilities.   
Results. This study found a significantly higher risk of both PPH and having Medicare 
expenditures in the top 90th percentile among both Medicare-only long-term care facility 
residents and dual eligible community residents as compared to dual eligible long-term 
care facility residents, yet Medicare-only long-term care facility residents had 
significantly lower per capita Medicare expenditures than did their dual eligible 
counterparts residing in long-term care facilities. The results of this study also indicate 
that state Medicaid bed hold policies had no statistically significant effect on either risk 
of PPH or on Medicare expenditures.  
Conclusion. The finding that Medicare-only residents of long-term care facilities are less 
expensive to the Medicare system, on average, than their dual eligible long-term care 
facility resident peers, yet are more likely to be hospitalized for a preventable condition 
and are more likely to be among the most expensive Medicare beneficiaries, could 
indicate differential patterns of intensity of medical response to similar clinical conditions 
between the two groups. That state Medicaid bed hold policies were not associated with 
any of the measures of healthcare utilization in our study seems to suggest that this 
Medicaid policy does not provide the perverse incentive toward higher utilization that 
some studies suggest. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 As baby boomers age, and medical science leads to increased longevity, the 
number of elderly Americans in need of long-term care is expected to grow significantly 
in the coming years (Schneider & Guralnik, 1990; Laxdawalla & Phillipson, 2002; CBO, 
2013). However, as Medicare does not provide reimbursement for long-term care 
services and supports (LTCSS) outside of the post-acute setting, and Medicaid coverage 
for  LTCSS is limited to only those Americans with significant income-based and clinical 
needs, many Americans rely solely on informal care for their long-term care support, as 
formal long-term care is prohibitively expensive for the majority of elderly individuals in 
need of long-term care (CMS, 2015; Wiener, et al., 2013; Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 2013; Genworth, 2016).  
 Research has found that unmet long-term care need is associated with poor health 
outcomes and overutilization of the healthcare system (Walsh, E.G., 2012; Sands, et al., 
2006; Kuzuya, et al., 2008; Quail, Wolfson, & Lipman, 2011; Hass, et al., 2015). 
Although long-term has been demonstrated to reduce poor health outcomes among frail 
elderly individuals, there is also evidence that comprehensiveness of long-term care 
affects both health outcomes and healthcare utilization (Kuzuya, 2006; Freedman & 
Spillman, 2014; SCAN Foundation, 2011; Wysocki, et al., 2014). However, research has 
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also suggested that Medicaid policy can have perverse effects on healthcare utilization—
specifically, a number of studies have suggested that the presence of state Medicaid bed 
hold policies encourage the unnecessary hospitalization of Medicaid beneficiaries—and, 
to a smaller extent—other beneficiaries, at significant potential costs to the Medicare 
system (Intrator, et al., 2007; Intrator, et al., 2009; Grabowski, et al., 2010; Unruh, et al., 
2013).  
 The objective of this dissertation research was to examine the interplay between 
comprehensiveness of long-term care (comparing residents of formal long-term care 
facilities to similarly-frail individuals residing in the community) and payor status on 
Medicare-funded healthcare utilization, in terms of both potentially preventable 
hospitalization (PPH) and Medicare expenditures, utilizing a retrospective cohort analysis 
which resulted in the creation of four cohorts: Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the 
community; Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities; 
Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community; and 
Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities. The 
specific aims of the study were: 1) examine the risk of PPH between the four matched 
cohorts; and 2) examine median per capita Medicare expenditures as well as risk of being 
in the 90th percentile of Medicare expenditures between the four matched cohorts. It is 
anticipated that while Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities 
will have the lowest risk of PPH, the lowest Medicare expenditures per capita, and the 
lowest risk of being in the 90th percentile of Medicare expenditures, dual-eligible 
beneficiaries who reside in long-term facilities will be the second lowest group on all 
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measures, as the protective effect of comprehensive long-term care will outweigh the 
effects of perverse incentives linked to Medicaid policy.  
 This dissertation is formatted using the manuscript style: Chapters 4 (Results) and 
5 (Conclusions) were replaced with two manuscripts representing the two specific aims 
examined. Chapter 2 provides a review of scholarly literature as to the current state of 
long-term care policy in America today, and factors associated with differences in 
healthcare utilization among individuals in need of long-term care. Chapter 3 provides an 
overview of the methodology implemented in this study. Chapter 4 examines the effects 
of long-term care facility residency and payor type of risk of PPH among frail elderly 
Medicare beneficiaries, while Chapter 5 examines the effects of long-term care facility 
residency and payor type on Medicare expenditures among frail elderly Medicare 
beneficiaries. Chapter 6 concludes with a highlight of major findings of this dissertation 
research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Need for Long-Term Care in America 
 The National Institutes of Health define long-term care as “care [that] involves a 
variety of services designed to meet a person’s health or personal care needs during a 
short or long period of time,” and goes on to state that long term care services “help 
people live as independently and safely as possible when they can no longer perform 
everyday activities on their own” (NIH SeniorHealth, 2015). Essentially, long-term care 
is an umbrella term that refers to any care provided with the goal of halting functional 
and medical deterioration and assisting frail individuals with daily living needs. Long-
term care can be provided in a number of settings, including skilled nursing facilities, 
through home visitation programs, in assisted living facilities, or informally by family 
members, and can include services that range from assistance with instrumental activities 
of daily living (IADLs) (such as grocery shopping and taking care of pets), to assistance 
with basic activities of daily living (ADLs) (such as bathing and toileting), to medical 
services that span a continuum between simple prescription drug management to 
assistance with continuous dialysis (Lawton & Brody, 1969; Katz, 1983; Reddy, et al., 
2007).   
 In 2012, it was estimated that twelve million Americans were in need of long-
term care, (Scan Foundation, 2012), and approximately sixty-three percent of Americans 
in need of long-term care are aged 65 and older (Eckenwiler, 2007). The vast majority of 
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older individuals in need of long-term care resided in the community, although nearly 
two million lived in nursing homes (Kaye, Harrington, & LaPlante, 2010). As the aged 
population in the United States grows due to increased longevity and the aging of the 
baby boomers (Schneider & Guralnik, 1990; Lakdawalla & Philipson, 2002), if the 
proportion of the aged population in need of long-term care remains static, 9.6 million 
individuals aged 65 and older will need long-term care in 2030, rising to over 14 million 
in 2050 (CBO, 2013).  
Estimates for odds of requiring long-term care during one’s lifetime vary, and 
take into consideration population-level ADL impairment rates and historical patterns of 
long-term care utilization. The most widely-used model of long-term care utilization is 
the “Robinson care status transition matrix,” which employs a Continuous-Time Markov 
Chain model using data from the 1982, 1984, and 1989 National Long-Term Care 
Surveys, and has been used in combination with data from the 1985 National Nursing 
Home Survey to estimate a lifetime risk of need for nursing home care of 39% 
(Robinson, 2002; Brown & Finkelstein, 2006). However, recent research using more 
recent data from the Health and Retirement Study suggests that the Robinson model 
underestimates the need for long-term care by failing to account for nursing home stays 
that are relatively short—for example, data such as that in the National Long-Term Care 
Surveys that is collected at one time point per wave fails to catch the many individuals 
who live in the community at time point one, enter a nursing home between time one and 
time two, yet either die or are transferred back to the community prior to time two (Hurd, 
Michaud, & Rohwedder, 2014). Accounting for these “short-stay” nursing home residents 
through the use of exit interviews, researchers have found a lifetime risk of need for 
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nursing home care of nearly 58% (Id.). A study conducted using data from the Center for 
Retirement Research found a similar lifetime risk, with 44% of men estimated to require 
nursing home care during their lifetime, and 58% of women (Friedberg, et al., 2014).  
Comprehensive long-term care that fully meets the needs of recipients can be 
difficult to achieve through informal care alone, but access to formal long-term care can 
be prohibitively expensive for many Americans. The average cost of a one month stay in 
an assisted living facility is $3,293, while the average cost of one month of nursing home 
care is $6,235 for a semi-private room (DHS, 2016). Adult day care services—which 
allow working caregivers a place to leave their loved ones in need of long-term care 
while they are at work—cost $67 per day, which is considerably less expensive than the 
alternative of in-home health aide care, which costs approximately $21 per hour, or $168 
per eight-hour day (DHS, 2016).   
Provision of and Payment for Long-Term Care 
Private Long-Term Care Insurance 
Despite the statistics regarding likelihood of need for long-term care in one’s 
lifetime, and the high costs of formal long-term care, only ten percent of individuals over 
age 50 have purchased long-term care insurance (Andrews, 2010). Much research has 
been conducted into better understanding private long-term care insurance uptake, with 
much of the evidence pointing to a fundamental problem with the way that consumers 
perceive long-term care insurance. Research has shown that consumers do not view long-
term care insurance as insurance, but rather as an investment—in essence, consumers 
view payment of long-term care insurance premiums as a waste of money unless they 
actually use long-term care, and so are often only incentivized to purchase it if they feel 
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confident that they will actually need long-term care (Gottlieb & Mitchell, 2015). 
Insurance companies are aware of this potential adverse selection problem, and adjust for 
it by increasing the premiums for long-term care insurance based on a number of factors 
that would indicate higher risk of long-term care utilization—the primary factor being 
age (Finkelstein & McGarry, 2006; Sloan & Norton, 1997). For instance, while the U.S. 
government cites the average cost of a long-term care policy as approximately $2,207 per 
year for five years of coverage (DHS, 2016), in reality, in South Carolina, this level of 
premium would be accurate for a healthy sixty-year-old male, and would provide a daily 
maximum coverage of $150 per day—while nursing home daily rates average $190 per 
day in the state (Genworth, 2016; Genworth, 2015). A healthy seventy-year-old male 
who wishes to purchase coverage of $200 per day in South Carolina will need to spend 
approximately $7,000 per year in premiums, while an individual in poor health or in need 
of assistance with multiple ADLs will pay considerably higher premiums, and most likely 
be subject to a waiting period before benefits accrue (Genworth 2016; Genworth 2015).  
These supply-side issues have been examined in depth, with Brown and 
Finkelstein finding an average 18 percent load factor for long-term care carried by a 65-
year-old until death—meaning that for every dollar of premium paid, the beneficiary will 
only receive 82 cents worth of long-term care benefits—which compares unfavorably to 
the average load of 8 percent on health insurance (Brown & Finkelstein, 2004; 
Newhouse, 2002). Brown and Finkelstein also join the researchers who cite limited 
benefits as a potential explanation of low long-term care insurance uptake, yet assert that 
neither high costs nor limited benefits can truly explain the relative failure of private 
long-term care to gain a hold in the market, citing stark differences in actuarial fairness 
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between males and females (with females actually averaging favorable a load of -4%), as 
well as the availability of comprehensive coverage that consumers choose not to purchase 
(Id.) Instead, Brown and Finkelstein point to  demand-side factors—particularly the 
existence of informal care and Medicaid as substitutes for privately insuring for potential 
long-term care needs (Brown & Finkelstein, 2008).   
Medicaid as a Payer for Long-Term Care 
 Many Americans seem to believe—often mistakenly—that they can rely on 
Medicaid as an insurer of last resort to provide coverage for any long-term care needs 
that might arise (Brown, Goda, & McGarry, 2012; Brown & Finkelstein, 2008). In 
reality, although Medicaid is the primary payer of long-term care in this country, strict 
income, asset, and medical needs standards set by individual states govern eligibility for 
Medicaid coverage for long-term care. Although income eligibility standards vary greatly 
from state to state, a number of states require that individuals aged 65 or older either be 
eligible to receive benefits under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program 
(which would equate to an income of no more than $710 per month in 2013 for an 
individual and $1,066 for a married couple) or have income below the federal poverty 
level (which in 2013 was set at $957.50 per month for an individual and $1,292.50 per 
month for a married couple in 2013) in order to be eligible for full Medicaid coverage 
(Social Security Office of Retirement and Disability Policy, 2012; Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 2013).  
 Individuals who do not purchase long-term care insurance, and who cannot self-
insure, yet require long-term care can attempt to obtain Medicaid-funded long-term care 
coverage through three avenues: they may choose to engage in what is referred to in the 
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world of trust and estate law as “Medicaid planning”; they may spend down assets and 
income on long-term care until their assets and income reach the level of Medicaid 
eligibility; or they may find an alternative means to receiving long-term care services. 
The first method— “Medicaid planning”—is highly controversial, as it allows individuals 
to shelter their assets via a number of legal maneuvers including transfers to spouses, 
transfers to caregiving children, creation of a number of different types of trusts, and, in 
some cases, divorce in order to become eligible for Medicaid without spending down 
assets (Takacs & McGuffey, 2002; Kapp, 2006). Through utilization of this often 
ethically questionable planning method, individuals who could afford to finance their 
long-term care for some period of time are instead able to have the necessary long-term 
care paid in full through the Medicaid system. The federal government has attempted to 
quell the use of such legal loopholes to game the public long-term care financing system 
by requiring a 5-year lookback period on many types of asset transfers, while still 
allowing for transfers designed to leave the spouse of a long-term care recipient with 
income and assets on which to live, with questionable success (Reif, 2010; Baird, Hurd, 
& Rohwedder, 2014).  
 The second option available to those who are in need of long-term care, and hope 
to obtain coverage through Medicaid, is the income and asset spend-down option. 
Essentially, if a would-be Medicaid beneficiary is in need of comprehensive long-term 
care, he or she can begin receiving care by paying out of pocket, and continue to do so 
until his or her income and assets are diminished to the extent that they become eligible 
for Medicaid (Wiener, et al., 2013). This option provides allowances for a community-
dwelling spouse’s monthly maintenance and housing needs as well as total resource and 
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home equity allowances for such spouse (CMS, 2016). The income and asset standards 
set forth by the federal government to protect community-dwelling spouses often do not 
rise to the level of income and assets that would be sheltered under Medicaid planning 
methods, but do ensure in nearly all cases that the community-dwelling spouse will not 
be impoverished if the decision is made to spend-down assets in anticipation of 
qualification for Medicaid-funded long-term care. In 2013, community-dwelling spouses 
in all states but Alaska and Hawaii could retain a maximum of $2,898 for minimum 
monthly maintenance, $581.63 for housing, and total resources of $115,920 in non-
housing assets as well as $802,000 in home equity resources (CMS, 2013).  
Medicare’s Role in Long-Term Care 
By design, Medicare does not cover long term care, instead providing coverage 
for hospital inpatient and skilled nursing facility care in acute cases and cases in which a 
determination has been made that care is necessary for a patient’s condition to improve or 
to prevent or slow a decline in condition, as well as home health care in cases in which a 
physician has certified that the care is medically necessary to treat an illness or injury, 
and hospice care in cases in which a patient has a life expectancy of less than six months 
and has chosen to discontinue curative care (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2015; Jimmo v. Sebelius, 2013). Medicare also covers provider services and visits, 
surgery, durable medical equipment, lab tests, and prescription drugs (CMS, 2015).  
While it would seem that the requirement that skilled nursing care be necessary to 
prevent or slow a decline in condition could lend itself to considerable long term care 
coverage for those who need it, in reality, Medicare places additional conditions on the 
payment for such services. Beneficiaries hoping for Medicare financing of long term care 
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in a nursing facility must: (1) have had a recent hospital stay of at least three consecutive 
days; (2) be admitted to a Medicare-certified skilled nursing facility within thirty days of 
that hospital stay; and (3) be in need of skilled care, such as skilled nursing or therapy, as 
opposed to help with activities of daily living alone (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2014). Once these three conditions are satisfied, Medicare will only 
cover one hundred percent of a beneficiary’s costs during the beneficiary’s first twenty 
days in the skilled nursing facility, followed by any expenses over $140.00 per day for 
the next eighty days, and will not provide any coverage for skilled nursing facility stays 
in excess of 100 days per year (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2014).   
Similarly, although in theory Medicare could be understood to provide long term 
care services in the form of home health care, coverage for this care, too, is time-limited 
as well as subject to the condition that the care provided be “medically necessary” in the 
form of intermittent skilled nursing care, physical therapy, speech-language pathology 
services, and/or continued occupational therapy to treat an illness or injury (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). Medicare specifically excludes from coverage 
personal care and help with activities of daily living in the absence of illness or injury 
that requires skilled nursing care (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015).    
Informal Care 
 Due in large part of the high costs of formal long-term care, two thirds of older 
Americans who require long-term care receive this care exclusively through informal, 
unpaid care provided by family and friends, with an additional twenty-five percent 
receiving care through a patchwork of informal and formal care (most of whom receive 
some formal home health services in addition to care provided by loved ones) (Doty, 
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2010). Less than ten percent of individuals over 65 who are in need of long-term care 
receive all of their care through a formal long-term care provider (i.e., through a 
residential care facility) (Id.).  
 While informal caregiving decreases the burden on publicly-funded insurers of 
long-term care, and is often regarded as an economical alternative to paying for these 
services out of pocket, it too comes with steep costs. To begin, informal long-term care 
places high physiological, emotional, and financial burdens on informal caregivers. 
Caregiving has been shown to cause chronic stress, and thus to lead to a number of poor 
physiological and mental health effects (Schulz & Sherwood, 2008; Vitaliano, Zhang, & 
Scanlan, 2003). Specifically, caregivers have been shown to have lowered immune 
function and cognition, and increased inflammation and cell aging compared to non-
caregivers (Fonareva & Oken, 2014), as well as significantly increased rates of 
depression and other mental stress (Pinquart & Sorensen, 2003).  
The overburdening of caregivers not only harms caregivers themselves, but also 
threatens the health and well-being of their charges. Studies show that increasing levels 
of personal and role-based caregiver burden lead to increased hospitalizations and all-
cause mortality among frail elderly care recipients (Kuzuya, et al., 2011), though there is 
evidence that caregiver burden has little to no effect on frail older individual’s utilization 
of physician outpatient services (Reckrey, et al., 2013). Whether such findings may 
indicate a tendency of overburdened caregivers to forego preventive and non-acute 
ameliorative care services, thus leading to acute care admissions for ambulatory-care 
sensitive conditions (ACSCs), is yet to be determined.  As informal caregiving is the 
primary method of provision of long-term care in this country, the potential effects of this 
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form of care on health outcomes and utilization patterns of those receiving care is a 
policy concern.  
Substitution of Care 
 For the millions of frail elderly who are in need of long-term care, yet receive 
either no such care or, more likely, some level of informal care that may leave them with 
unmet need, substitution of care is a concern. Put simply, if long-term needs are left 
unmet (or if caregiver strain is such that needs are in danger of not being met), one of two 
scenarios are likely to unfold: either alternative means of meeting these needs must be 
found, or these frail individuals’ health states will decline in ways that lead to preventable 
health system utilization, often in the form of potentially preventable hospitalizations 
(PPH). As virtually all Americans aged 65 and older have either free or low cost health 
care through Medicare, the most likely source of payment for either of these scenarios 
would seem to be Medicare.  
 Recent research suggests that the former scenario—that of seeking Medicare 
payment for long-term care services in the absence of another form of long-term care 
coverage—does in fact occur with regard to Medicare Part B home health claims 
(Avalere Health, 2008). The SCAN Foundation has found that, among Medicare 
beneficiaries with at least one ADL need, per capita Part B home health care spending is 
nearly twice as high as per capita Part A home health care spending ($812 vs 442 in 
2005) (Id.). Given that Part A home health referrals (i.e., post-acute referrals) are time-
limited, while Part B home health referrals (which originate from a physician outside of 
an acute setting) are not, these researchers argue that physicians are referring patients in 
need of long-term care to home health agencies through the Medicare Part B mechanism, 
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thus using the Medicare system as a substitute payer of long-term care services. Such 
substitution can only occur with respect to Part B-funded home health services, as 
nursing facility services and Part A-funded services are time-limited. Similar cost-
shifting has also been shown to originate as overt state Medicaid program “Medicare 
maximization” policies that encourage home health providers to seek out ways to bill 
Medicare, rather than Medicaid, for home health services (Grabowski, 2007; USGAO, 
1997). 
The potential for the latter scenario—that of overutilization of the health care 
system—arises when unmet long-term care need precipitates a decline in health, leading 
to PPH and other inefficient health system utilization. While the primary focus of long-
term care is in providing assistance with ADLs and IADLs, formal long-term care has 
also proven to be effective in helping to reduce negative health outcomes among 
recipients. Unmet long-term care needs have consistently been demonstrated to lead to 
poor health outcomes—individuals with unmet need with regard to assistance with ADLs 
and IADLs are considerably more likely than their counterparts whose ADL and IADL 
needs are met to have a potentially preventable hospitalization, to visit the Emergency 
Department, and to have a large number of physician visits (Walsh, E.G., 2012; Sands, et 
al., 2006; Xu, et al., 2012; Kuzuya et al., 2008; Quail, Wolfson, & Lippman, 2011;  Hass, 
et al., 2015). Frail elderly individuals with unmet long-term care needs are also at a 
greater risk of death compared to similarly-situated frail elderly individuals whose long-
term care needs are appropriately met (Kuzuya, 2006). Reasons for these negative 
outcomes include a lack of assistance with managing chronic medical conditions (Allen 
& Mor, 1997), a lack of assistance with medication management (Kuzuya, 2008) 
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increased likelihood of accidental injury (LaPlante, et al., 2004; Komisar, Feder, & 
Kasper, 2005), and increased rates of depression in the population of frail elderly who 
have unmet long-term care needs (Allen & Mor, 1997), which has been shown to put 
older adults at increased risk of subsequent physical decline (Penninx, et al., 1998).  
 Although long-term care in general has been shown to reduce poor health 
outcomes among individuals in need of such care, there is further evidence that the 
location and type of the long-term care provided play a role in health outcomes and 
healthcare utilization. Frail elderly adults who receive comprehensive adult day care 
services have been shown to have considerably lower mortality and healthcare utilization 
rates than their counterparts who also live in the community but do not receive such 
comprehensive services (Kuzuya, 2006). One recent study has found that rates of adverse 
consequences associated with unmet long-term care need (including self-soiling, inability 
to bathe, inability to properly manage medications, going without food, and missing 
health care appointments) were considerably higher among frail elderly who received 
paid home health services than among similarly situated frail elderly who resided in 
nursing homes (Freedman & Spillman, 2014). Research conducted by the SCAN 
Foundation has demonstrated that annual per capita Medicare spending in 2006 for older 
Americans with disabilities was considerably higher among those beneficiaries who 
reside in the community ($18,308) compared to those who resided in assisted living 
facilities ($14,001) and skilled nursing facilities ($14,594) (SCAN Foundation, 2011). 
Wysocki, et al., have found that elderly users of formal home and community based long-
term care services were at increased risk of both potentially preventable hospitalizations 
and non-potentially preventable hospitalizations compared to elderly nursing home 
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residents with similar levels of physical and medical decline (Wysocki, et al., 2014). 
These findings seem to indicate that unmet long-term care need and associated health 
decline is greater among individuals who live in the community than it is among 
individuals who receive formal long-term care in residential facilities, which supports the 
theory that individuals who must rely on informal care for the bulk of their long-term 
care support will be more likely to utilize the health care system to address health issues 
that may have been avoidable with proper long-term care services and supports. 
Why it Matters 
 If it is indeed true that individuals with unmet long-term care needs will have 
poorer health outcomes and higher rates of health system utilization than individuals with 
similar levels of functional decline and chronic condition morbidity who have no unmet 
long-term care needs, and it is also the case that comprehensive, formal long-term care 
leads to fewer unmet needs than informal long-term care, at least with regard to patients 
with a certain level of functional and health decline, then it seems that our current system 
of classifying long-term care as separate from health care might be ripe for reevaluation. 
Currently, Medicare only provides coverage on a limited basis for long-term care, much 
of which must be post-acute care, and all of which must be tangential to necessary 
medical care. This has created a situation in which formal long-term care services are 
only available to individuals who were already eligible for Medicaid by virtue of low-
income status, those wealthy enough to afford to pay out of pocket—either directly for 
services or for long-term care insurance, those sophisticated enough and motivated to 
engage in Medicaid planning, or those who engage in a spend-down of assets. While the 
rationale for this seems to be that long-term care is something outside of health care—a 
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luxury, perhaps—what we are learning about the effects of long-term care (or lack 
thereof) on health seem to indicate that this theory might be misguided. As our nation 
looks to preventive care as a way to combat rising health care costs by forestalling the 
development of disease, we might also do well to consider the potential role of 
comprehensive long-term care in reducing poor health outcomes, and thus reducing 
health care utilization.  
Medicaid Policy and Health Care Utilization 
 In theory, to determine whether publicly-funded long-term care services do, in 
fact, reduce health system utilization we need only examine the effect of Medicaid 
generosity in long-term care services on health care system utilization among individuals 
eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid. If health system utilization is significantly 
higher among similarly situated Medicare-only beneficiaries who do not receive formal 
long-term care than it is among dual eligible beneficiaries who receive formal, Medicaid-
funded long-term care, this could indicate a need to reevaluate current policies as to the 
public provision of funding for long-term care. 
 Although Medicaid generosity indices have been used previously to examine the 
effects of Medicaid policy on various social and health-related outcomes, these indices 
typically focus on the effects of Medicaid generosity on non-elderly adults or children. 
We have found only one instance of utilization of a Medicaid long-term care generosity 
index: a 2010 study by Fossett and Burke utilized an index of Medicaid program 
generosity developed by Park (Park, 2007) to examine the interaction of multiple state 
long-term care policies on long-term care spending (Fossett & Burke, 2010). This 
Medicaid program generosity index was constructed using factor analysis of eight 
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variables: (1) nursing home payment per diem; (2) nursing home bed ratio per 1,000 
elderly aged 65 and over; (3) Medicaid payments to elderly nursing home residents aged 
65 and over; (4) ratio of Medicaid payments to nursing homes to private payments; (5) 
1915(c) HCBS waiver expenditure per elderly Medicaid enrollee; (6) Medicaid payments 
for home health per elderly enrollee; (7) percentage of nursing home residents to the 
elderly population aged 65 years and older; and (8) percentage of the aged Medicaid 
enrollees to the elderly population aged 65 years and older (Id.).  
While this index may provide an effective means of studying demand-side aspects 
of Medicaid long-term care policy, it cannot be used to answer the question of whether 
increasing publicly-funded long-term care coverage can decrease unnecessary health care 
utilization. One reason that we cannot use this model for our study is the dearth of factors 
that measure the generosity of long-term care eligibility—that is, how easy it is for 
individuals who need long-term care coverage to meet Medicaid long-term care 
eligibility requirements. This issue is easily surmountable—indeed, Park accounted for 
this problem in his dissertation work, controlling in his models for presence or absence of 
different state-level eligibility programs and income standards (Park, ibid).  
However, a larger problem with the use of a Medicaid generosity index to 
determine the effects of Medicaid long-term care coverage on health system utilization 
emerges. One could reasonably hypothesize that states with more generous Medicaid 
eligibility policies—and that also have accessible paths to Medicaid-covered long-term 
care service and support obtainment—should have lower Medicare-funded health care 
utilization per beneficiary given what we know about long-term care’s ability to decrease 
unnecessary health care utilization and poor health outcomes. However, this hypothesis 
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fails to account for the existence of market forces that both precipitate market responses 
and create unintended perverse incentives in the Medicare and Medicaid long-term care 
coverage systems. These responses to the market on one hand impede access to long-term 
care for Medicaid beneficiaries, and on the other actually incentivize the utilization of 
Medicare-funded acute care services by dual eligible beneficiaries receiving Medicaid-
funded long-term care.  
The first market response reflects the higher rates that long-term care providers 
can receive from virtually any payer other than Medicaid, which results in Medicaid-
funded long-term care consumers being viewed as the least desirable additions to the 
patient panel. In 2012, of the 15,652 nursing homes nationwide that accepted Medicaid 
beneficiaries, 14,332 were also certified to accept individuals whose care was funded by 
Medicare (CMS, 2013(b)). As the average margin on Medicare payments to nursing 
homes in this country has been over 10 percent since the turn of the last century (CMS, 
2013(b)), while the average shortfall on Medicaid payments has consistently been nearly 
10 percent (CMS, 2013(b)), nursing home and home health administrators often view 
Medicaid-funded long-term care recipients as the least attractive consumers of care 
(Reschovsky, 1996). Nursing homes in particular compete for higher paying residents, 
hoping to fill as many beds as possible with Medicare patients (Zinn, et al., 2007; 
Gleckman, 2013). By prioritizing admissions of Medicare beneficiaries and private pay 
consumers of care over Medicaid beneficiaries, nursing facilities—and to a lesser extent, 
home health agencies—reduce the ability of Medicaid-funded frail older adults to access 
necessary care—particularly those Medicaid beneficiaries who are high acuity, as these 
individuals would represent steeper losses for providers than would low acuity 
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beneficiaries (Feng, et al., 2006; Miller, et al., 2009). Thus, we cannot assume that more 
generous Medicaid long-term care coverage necessarily correlates with sufficient access 
to needed long-term care services.  
The second market response occurs in response to Medicaid bed-hold policies, 
which have been adopted by thirty-six states and the District of Columbia to provide 
continuity of nursing home placement in the event that a resident must be hospitalized 
(National Long-Term Care Ombudsman Resource Center, 2012). These policies provide 
Medicaid reimbursement for beds that are temporarily empty due to the hospitalization of 
a Medicaid patient, in return for the facility’s reservation of the bed in anticipation of the 
beneficiary’s return. The generosity of Medicaid bed-hold policies vary significantly by 
state, with some states requiring a minimum nursing home occupancy rate to employ the 
bed-hold reimbursement payments while others do not, and some states allowing for only 
four days of reimbursed bed-hold, while others do not set a maximum number of days 
during which a bed can be held (Id.).  
Bed-hold policies were put in place to protect Medicaid beneficiaries by 
preventing the loss of their beds to more lucrative Medicare and private-pay patients. As 
Intrator, et al., have pointed out, bed-hold policies have also created a powerful perverse 
incentive: if the marginal profit of holding a bed under Medicaid-reimbursed bed-hold 
policy is greater than the marginal profit of keeping the Medicaid patient in the facility, 
the facility has every incentive to hospitalize the Medicaid beneficiary (Intrator, et al., 
2007). Indeed, states with bed-hold policies of at least average generosity have been 
shown to have significantly higher rates of transfer from nursing homes to hospitals than 
states without bed-hold policies (Id.; Intrator, et al., 2009).  
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As these bed-hold policies only apply to nursing home residents whose long-term 
care services are covered by Medicaid, one would assume that nursing facilities are apt to 
hospitalize Medicaid beneficiaries at higher rates than their Medicare-funded and private 
pay counterparts. Grabowski, et al., partially refute this theory in a study that 
demonstrates the tendency of Medicare-funded short-term stay skilled nursing facility 
residents in states with generous bed-hold policies to be hospitalized at higher rates than 
their counterparts residing in states without generous bed-hold policies (Grabowski, et al., 
2010). While Grabowski and his colleagues do make the point that Medicaid bed-hold 
policies likely affect the culture of long-term care facilities as it pertains to 
hospitalization decisions for all residents, regardless of payer, their study did not examine 
relative hospitalization rates between those whose care was funded by Medicaid and 
those whose care was funded by Medicare. While Medicaid bed-hold policies may lead to 
spillover effects in the non-Medicaid population of long-term care residents, there is 
evidence that payer status does indeed interact with these policies to contribute to 
increased rates of hospitalization among Medicaid beneficiaries (Unruh, et al., 2013).  
The final market response with potential to affect Medicaid long-term care 
beneficiaries’ utilization of the health care system stems from the interplay between dual 
eligibility and Medicare’s payment for post-acute care services in long-term care 
facilities. Medicaid long-term care beneficiaries who are also eligible for Medicare are 
typically eligible for more lucrative Medicare-funded post-acute care once they return to 
their original long-term care facility following a hospital stay of at least three days. This 
creates incentives for nursing homes to hospitalize Medicaid beneficiaries unnecessarily 
in order not only to avoid utilizing nursing home resources to care for a sick patient, but 
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also to ensure considerably higher reimbursement rates for care provided as the patient 
recovers from his or her illness (Grabowski, 2007; Ouslander & Berenson, 2011).  
Although research into the effects of Medicaid bed-hold policies on health 
outcomes of Medicaid long-term care beneficiaries as compared to similarly situated 
long-term care recipients financed through other payment sources is sparse—and even 
less research has been conducted specifically into the effects of post-acute Medicare 
payments for Medicaid long-term care beneficiaries—research into the effects of state 
Medicaid policy on Medicaid beneficiary outcomes has demonstrated that these policies 
create incentives for providers to transfer Medicaid beneficiaries at significantly higher 
rates than their non-Medicaid beneficiary counterparts (Konetzka, Spector, & Limcangco, 
2008). Individuals whose long-term care is funded by Medicaid have higher rates of 
hospitalization for ambulatory care sensitive conditions (Konetzka, Spector, & Shaffer, 
2004; Spector, et al., 2013), as well as for all-cause hospitalizations (Intrator, Zinn, & 
Mor, 2004). 
Study Purpose 
Due to the existence of the market forces described above in the Medicaid long-
term care system, we cannot assume that individuals who receive Medicaid-financed 
long-term care services will utilize Medicare-financed health care in the same way as 
individuals whose long-term care is funded through non-Medicaid payers. However, even 
if the current evidence of policy-driven patterns of increased health system utilization by 
Medicaid-funded long-term care recipients holds, this does not necessarily indicate that 
Medicaid-funded long-term care recipients do not still benefit from long-term care 
overall, or that Medicare-financed hospitalizations are not still reduced in this population 
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as compared to similarly situated individuals who reside in the community. Just as studies 
have shown the positive effects of appropriate long-term care provision that meets the 
needs of its recipients, it may be that the perverse incentives that plague Medicaid-funded 
long-term care are outweighed by the positive overall effect of better care and better 
coordination of care that comes with receipt of formal long-term care.  
The objective of this retrospective cohort analysis was to examine potentially 
preventable hospitalization (PPH) and Medicare expenditure patterns of Medicare 
beneficiaries for whom, based on clinical, functional, and demographic factors, the 
provision of formal, comprehensive long-term care would be appropriate. The study was 
conducted using information from Medicare claims, available from the Research Data 
Assistance Center (ResDAC). This study focused on utilization and expenditure patterns 
among Medicare beneficiaries based on (1) long-term stay in a skilled nursing facility 
and (2) dual eligibility status. Thus, we compared rates of PPH, as well as Medicare 
expenditure patterns, between the following four groups:  
(1) Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community;  
(2) Medicare-only beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care 
facility;  
(3) Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries, residing in the community; and  
(4) Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a 
residential care facility.  
Study subjects were selected based on their clinical, functional, and demographic 
similarity to ensure similar levels of long-term care need across the four groups. Two 
specific aims were addressed in this study: the first examined differences in risk of PPH 
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between the four cohorts while controlling for person-level characteristics that influence 
risk of hospitalization and overall healthcare utilization as well as state Medicaid bed 
hold policies, which have been demonstrated to influence risk of hospitalization among 
Medicaid beneficiaries who reside in long-term care facilities, while the second examined 
average per capita Medicare expenditures between the four cohorts as well as average 
total annual Medicare charges between the four cohorts and risk of being in the 90th 
percentile—or most “high cost”—Medicare beneficiaries. To that end, the following were 
the aims of this study:  
(1) Examine the risk of PPH between four matched cohorts: Medicare-only 
beneficiaries residing in the community; Medicare-only beneficiaries who are 
long-stay residents of a residential care facility; Medicare/Medicaid dual-
eligible beneficiaries residing in the community; and Medicare/Medicaid 
dual-eligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care 
facility. 
Hypothesis 1: Medicare-only beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a 
residential care facility will have the lowest risk of PPH, followed by 
Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a 
residential care facility. Both groups receiving formal, residential long-term 
care will have lower PPH risks than their counterparts with similar levels of 
long-term care need who reside in the community. 
(2) Examine average per capita Medicare expenditures and risk of being a “high 
cost” Medicare beneficiary between four matched cohorts: Medicare-only 
beneficiaries residing in the community; Medicare-only beneficiaries who are 
25 
 
long-stay residents of a residential care facility; Medicare/Medicaid dual-
eligible beneficiaries residing in the community; and Medicare/Medicaid 
dual-eligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care 
facility. 
Hypothesis 2: Medicare-only beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a 
residential care facility will have the lowest Medicare expenditures, and be the 
least at risk of being a “high cost” Medicare beneficiary followed by 
Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a 
residential care facility. Both groups receiving formal, residential long-term 
care will have lower average Medicare expenditures than their counterparts 
with similar levels of long-term care need who reside in the community. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Study Design 
 This study utilized a retrospective cohort design using 2013 Medicare claims data, 
using state and county FIPS code to merge the Medicare claims data with AHRF data. In 
addition, information as to Medicaid bed-hold policies by state, authored by The National 
Long-Term Care Ombudsman Resource Center (National Long-Term Care Ombudsman 
Resource Center, 2012), was merged with the study data set.  
Theoretical Model  
 
 Our selection of matching variables was based in part on the Gelberg-Andersen  
Behavioral Model for Vulnerable Populations (Gelberg, Andersen, & Leake, 2000). 
Andersen’s model emphasizes the impact of both environmental and population variables 
on an individual’s health system utilization. In Andersen’s model, environmental factors 
influence three major forms of population characteristics that themselves affect each 
other, with predisposing characteristics (i.e., demographic, social, and cultural factors) 
affecting one’s enabling resources (i.e., financial and organizational factors), which in 
turn affect need for health services (both perceived need and evaluated need) (Babitsch, 
Gohl, & von Lengerke, 2012). In turn, both perceived and evaluated need affect health 
behavior in the form of personal health practices and use of health services, which affects 
health outcomes (Gelberg, Andersen, & Leake, 2000).  
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We posited that in the population of frail Medicare beneficiaries, predisposing 
characteristics (e.g., age, sex, and race/ethnicity) affect enabling resources (in this model 
the enabling resources are comprised of the two statuses that make up our key 
independent variable: Medicaid eligibility and method of long-term care provision). To 
begin, age affects method of long-term care provision in that the older a Medicare 
beneficiary is, the more likely they are to need formal long-term care, as factors such as 
widowhood and compounding of functional and clinical decline increase with age 
(Branch & Jette, 1982; Spillman & Lubitz, 2000). At the same time, age also affects 
ability to self-insure, as long-term care insurance premiums increase significantly with 
age (AALTCI, 2016). Sex affects enabling resources as men are more likely to have 
informal long-term care provided by wives (Navaie-Waliser, Spriggs, & Feldman, 2002; 
Lakdawalla & Philipson, 1998). Race and ethnicity affect enabling resources due to 
differential cultural norms between whites, African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians as 
to the burden of providing comprehensive informal care for an elderly relative, 
perceptions of duty to do so, as well as potential effects of discrimination on access to 
formal long-term care (Wallace, et al., 1997; Dilworth-Anderson, Williams, & Gibson, 
2002; Bradley, et al., 2002).  
 In turn, we believed that an individual’s status as to enabling resources (here, 
these two characteristics—insurance status and method of provision of long-term care—
make up our independent variable of interest) would affect their (or their caregiver’s) 
ability to ensure that their long-term care needs are met in full. We further posited that 
individuals whose needs are not met through long-term care that is appropriately 
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comprehensive/responsive to their functional and health needs would be more likely to 
have these unmet needs manifest in PPH.  
 While we acknowledge the environmental effects of the health system and public 
policy on population characteristics, these effects are not integral to our current study. 
However, we have modified Andersen’s model to account for the effects of external 
policies on risk of hospitalization. First, residents who live in counties with a higher 
number of hospital beds per 1000 population, as well as residents who live in counties 
with practice patterns that are associated with higher rates of hospitalization, will be more 
likely to be hospitalized generally (Fisher & Wennberg, 2003). Further, research has 
shown that Medicaid beneficiaries receiving formal, residential long-term care are at 
increased risk of hospitalization compared to non-Medicaid beneficiaries in the same 
long-term care facilities and with the same level of functional decline and health status 
due to the presence of perverse incentives caused by Medicaid long-term care policy 
(Wysocki, et al., 2014). 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
 Approval from the University of South Carolina IRB was granted on March 24, 
2016. The study was categorized as “exemption status,” as de-identified secondary data 
was utilized for this study. 
Data Sources 
 This study utilized data from the 5% sample of 2013 Medicare claims and 
enrollment data, available from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
through the Research Data Assistance Center (ResDAC). ResDAC is a consortium of 
researchers that house CMS data. The CMS data utilized for this study consisted of 
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Research Identifiable Files. A total of four 2013 Medicare claims and enrollment data 
files obtained from ResDac will be used: The Base A/B/C/D segment of the Master 
Beneficiary Summary File; the Chronic Conditions segment of the Master Beneficiary 
Summary File; the MedPAR All file; and the Medicare Carrier Claims file.  
 The Base A/B/C/D segment was used to identify beneficiary’s state and county of 
residence, as well as demographic characteristics and dual eligibility status. The Base 
A/B/C/D segment includes information as to beneficiary enrollment, including but not 
limited to ZIP Code (to determine county of residence), date of birth, date of death, 
race/ethnicity, sex, and dual enrollment status. The Chronic Conditions segment was used 
to identify presence or absence of one or more chronic conditions, as well as to identify 
whether or not a beneficiary had a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s or other form of senility. The 
Chronic Conditions segment contains information as to presence or absence of 27 distinct 
chronic conditions. The Carrier Claims File was used to determine location of residence 
of the Medicare beneficiary, as it is the only file available to us that allows for 
discernment of beneficiary place of residence based on the place of service of physician 
claims. We also used the Carrier Claims file to isolate primary, secondary, and tertiary 
diagnoses (if available) made by a physician during the beneficiary’s first physician visit 
of the study year. Finally, the MedPAR All file was used to analyze incidence of 
hospitalization among beneficiaries. The Medicare claims files contain Medicare 
utilization and expenditure data on an estimated 3 million Medicare beneficiaries for the 
year 2013.  
 In addition to these Medicare claims files, the Health Resources and Services 
(HRSA) Area Health Resource File (AHRF) was used to determine the rurality of 
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Medicare beneficiaries based on the Urban Influence Code tied to their county of 
residence. 
 A compilation of Medicaid bed-hold policies by state, authored by The National 
Long-Term Care Ombudsman Resource Center, was used to create a dichotomous 
variable for presence or absence of state bed-hold policies (National Long-Term Care 
Ombudsman Resource Center, 2012).  
Study Sample 
 The study sample included four cohorts of Medicare beneficiaries whose ADL 
needs, chronic condition status, and demographic characteristics made them likely to 
benefit from long-term care services and supports, distinguished by place of residence 
(community vs. residential care facility), as well as Medicaid long-term care coverage 
status (eligible for Medicaid-covered long-term care vs. not eligible). The four cohorts 
were: Medicare-only beneficiaries, residing in the community; Medicare-only 
beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care facility; Medicare/Medicaid 
dual-eligible beneficiaries, residing in the community; and Medicare/Medicaid dual-
eligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care facility. Residential 
care facilities were defined for the purposes of this study as facilities in which individuals 
reside in order to receive some level of long-term care services, and will include assisted 
living facilities, group homes, skilled nursing facilities, and nursing facilities, as 
designated in the Medicare Carrier Claims file. As there is no definitive means of 
differentiating long-stay residence in a residential care facility in the Medicare claims 
data, long-stay residence was defined as having two separate Medicare claims linked to a 
residential care facility in the Carrier Claims file as place of service that originated at 
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dates of at least 90 days apart. This method approximated that of Intrator, et al., who 
employed a similar method, using Medicare-required MDS assessments at intervals of at 
least 90 days when studying Medicare claims data (Intrator, et al., 2007).  
Exclusions 
 In order to arrive at our study sample, we first excluded from the original sample 
of approximately 3 million Medicare beneficiaries any individuals who are under age 65, 
thus removing the majority of Medicare beneficiaries who became eligible for Medicare 
due to a diagnosis of ESRD or other clinical diagnosis, leaving a population that has aged 
into Medicare eligibility. We also excluded any beneficiaries who turned 65 during the 
study year to ensure that each beneficiary studied has an entire year of potential claims 
available for analysis. Further, while the Medicare claims files include Medicare 
beneficiaries who participate in Medicare Advantage and other Managed Care 
Organization options, claims data as to these individuals is incomplete, necessitating our 
exclusion of this population from our study as well.  
Creation of Study Cohorts  
 To ensure, to the best of our ability, that the study population consists only of 
Medicare beneficiaries who due to functional, health, and demographic factors are likely 
to need long-term care, we first created a subset of Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible 
beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care facility. We then employed 
a validated matching methodology, with this subset as our reference/case group, 
ultimately choosing to undertake further analysis utilizing the matching methodology that 
provides the three control groups (Medicare-only beneficiaries, residing in the 
community; Medicare-only beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care 
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facility; and Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries, residing in the community). 
Thus, our final study population included only those beneficiaries who are similar to the 
Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of residential 
care facilities in terms of functional, clinical, and demographic characteristics.   
Matching Methodology 
 We undertook a 1:1:1:1 matching methodology to balance the distribution of 
variables associated with risk of need for long-term care in order to reduce bias in the 
estimation of need for long-term care. Although propensity score matching is the most 
common matching method used in observational studies (Pearl, 2010), there is evidence 
that the use of propensity scores for matching purposes such as ours can lead to a 
degradation of inferences due to model dependence (King & Nielsen, 2016). Therefore, 
we enacted an exact matching methodology in lieu of a propensity score matching 
methodology. Unfortunately, the Medicare claims data available to us does not include 
concrete indications of functional decline or need for assistance with ADLs. Thus, we 
chose to rely on clinical indicators of functional decline for which ICD-9 codes exist. 
While two independent studies have analyzed the effectiveness of using ICD-9 codes to 
predict “dependency in activities of daily living” (Faurot, et al., 2015) and “functional 
decline” (Rosen, et al., 2000), respectively, there is very little overlap between the 
conditions identified in the two studies: Faurot and colleagues have identified nine 
commonly-coded conditions that can serve as proxies for functional decline, as have 
Rosen, however, the only two conditions that are associated with functional decline in 
both studies are decubitus ulcers and forms of paralysis (Table 3.1).  
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As we did not have a good proxy variable available to indicate functional decline, 
we matched individuals based on presence of primary, secondary, and tertiary diagnoses 
of identical combinations of the conditions identified by Faurot, et al., and Rosen, et al., 
respectively. This method allowed matches to occur based on clinical conditions that do 
have the potential to indicate functional decline, but also based on clinical conditions 
such that individuals in our three non-Medicaid formal residential long-term care cohorts 
will have identical acuity levels to the base cohort. While not ideal, we believed that 
using the Medicaid formal residential long-term care cohort as a baseline for matching 
the other three cohorts was the best option available given the limitations in our data set.  
 Variables on which matches were made included: clinical diagnoses (primary, 
secondary, and tertiary, if available) as assessed by a physician during the study year, 
number of chronic conditions, Alzheimer’s/senility status, age, sex, and race. These 
variables were chosen based on a review of the literature which found these person-level 
characteristics most often associated with need for formal long-term care due to the 
interplay between age, clinical conditions that affect functional status, chronic condition 
worsening, the effects of chronic condition worsening on functional status, the effect of 
senility on functional status, and the effect of sex on frailty, independent of issues of 
longevity or spousal caregiver availability (Branch & Jette, 1982; Boult, et al., 1994; 
Millan-Calenti, et al., 2010; Tas, et al., 2007; Marengoni, et al., 2009).  
Race and ethnicity have consistently been demonstrated to be associated with type 
of long-term care utilization (whites have been shown to be significantly more likely to 
utilize formal long-term care services as compared to African Americans and Hispanics, 
who tend to rely more heavily on informal avenues of care) (Wallace, et al., 1998). 
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Researchers have postulated that these differences in utilization of formal long-term care 
services likely stem in part from cultural differences regarding familial caregiving norms 
(Mui & Burnette, 1994; Wallace, et al., 1998; Bradley, et al., 2002), although concerns 
about the existence of systemic barriers to access among non-whites could also partially 
explain these differences in utilization (Falcone & Broyles, 1994; Cagney & Agree, 1999; 
Akamigbo & Wolinsky, 2007). We do know, however, that racial and ethnic differences 
in type of long-term care utilization do not belie lower levels of long-term care need in 
these populations, as non-whites have also consistently been shown to have poorer health 
status than whites, both generally and specifically in areas that demonstrate need for 
long-term care (Fried, et al., 2001; Lapane & Davis, 2004).  
Our matching algorithm implemented a greedy/nearest neighbor matching 
method, without replacement (Austin, 2014). As research has shown that there is little 
difference between greedy and optimal methods of matching in terms of selection of sets 
of controls for overall matched pooled samples, the main concern in using greedy versus 
optimal matching algorithms lies in the ability of optimal matching to reduce distance 
within each pair (Gu & Rosenbaum, 1993). As our goal was to create matched cohorts to 
be used for logistic regression analysis, distance between individual matched pairs is not 
a concern. Furthermore, as our matching algorithm required exact matches as to up to 
three clinical diagnoses, as well as number of chronic conditions (0, 1-2, or 3+), sex, age 
group, and race, the potential for significant distance between four-way matched cohorts 
was low.  
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Study Variables 
Independent Variable 
 The independent variable of interest for both Aim 1 and Aim 2 was membership 
in one of four long-term care cohorts (Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the 
community; Medicare-only beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care 
facility; Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a 
residential care facility; and Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries, residing in 
the community).  
Dependent Variable  
 The dependent variable for Aim 1 was risk of PPH. The dependent variables for 
Aim 2 were (1) median total annual Medicare charges per beneficiary and (2) risk of 
being in the 90th percentile of Medicare expenditures. Twelve Prevention Quality 
Indicators (PQI) designated by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality as 
“ambulatory care sensitive conditions” were used as the basis for identification of PPH, 
with “low birth weight” and “asthma in younger adults” excluded from the list as 
inappropriate for the study population. In addition, as PPH among older individuals who 
require long-term care can encompass conditions that would not be considered PPH in 
healthier populations, we also included conditions identified by a technical expert panel 
on potentially preventable hospitalizations among dual-eligible beneficiaries who require 
long-term care as either preventable or manageable among all such beneficiaries or only 
likely to be preventable or manageable among those beneficiaries who reside in a nursing 
facility setting (Walsh, et al., 2012). The clinical indicators of PPH used for this study are 
displayed in Table 3.2. 
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Control Variables 
 As our matching algorithm was used to create four distinct cohorts, we needed 
only to control for the characteristics on which the cohorts were not matched as they 
pertain to potential to affect risk of PPH, as well as costs of PPH and total Medicare 
costs, respectively. Thus, beneficiary-level control variables included state Medicaid bed-
hold policy (yes/no), rurality of residence (rural versus urban), and, within the two 
cohorts representing residents of long-term care facilities, facility type (assisted living 
facility; custodial care facility; skilled nursing facility; or nursing facility), at the 
beneficiary level.  
Analytic Approach 
Aim 1 
 Wald chi-square tests (α = 0.05) assessed differences in PPH by cohort status and 
covariate. Modified Poisson regression models estimated the relative risk of PPH among 
our four matched cohorts, as well as between the two cohorts representing residents of 
long-term care facilities, respectively, with dual-eligible beneficiaries residing in long-
term care facilities as our referent. 
Aim 2 
 Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA on ranks tests (α = 0.05) assessed differences in 
median per capita Medicare expenditures by cohort status, as well as by level of covariate 
within each cohort. Modified Poisson regression models estimated the relative risk of 
membership in the top 90th percentile or “high cost” group of Medicare beneficiaries, 
among our four matched cohorts, as well as between the two cohorts representing 
residents of long-term care facilities, respectively, with dual-eligible beneficiaries 
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residing in long-term care facilities as our referent. Finally, generalized linear models 
estimated the associations between cohort status and estimated log-transformed total 
Medicare expenditures per beneficiary.  
The statistical analyses were conducted using SAS statistical software, version 9.3 
(SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC). Approval from the University of South Carolina 
Institutional Review Board was granted on March 24, 2016. The study was categorized as 
“exemption status,” as de-identified secondary data was utilized for this study. 
Table 3.1. Clinical Conditions Associated with Functional Decline in the Literature 
Condition  ICD-9 Code(s) Source 
DM Complications 250.4, 250.6, 250.7, 
250.9 
Faurot, et al. 
Podiatric Care 700., 703., 681.1 Faurot, et al. 
Heart Failure 428., 425., 429.0, 
429.1, 429.3, 429.4 
Faurot, et al. 
Sepsis 01., 036. 038., 040.0, 
041., 032.0, 032.1, 
681.,682., 730., 031.0, 
031.2, 790.7, 032.82, 
032.83, 053.0, 053.13, 
054.5, 136.3, 320.0, 
785.4, 112.83, 112.81, 
112.5 
 
Faurot, et al. 
Difficult Walking 719.7, 781.2, 781.3, 
438.85, v46.3 
Faurot, et al. 
Stroke/Brain Injury 348., 430., 431., 432., 
852., 853., 854., 
349.82, 433.01, 433.11, 
433.21, 433.31, 433.91, 
434.01, 434.11, 434.91 
Faurot, et al. 
Weakness 728.2, 728.87, 799.3, 
728.2, 728.3, v49.84 
Faurot, et al. 
Decubitus Ulcer/Pressure Ulcer 707.0, 707.2, 707. Faurot, et al.; Rosen, et 
al. 
Paralysis/Hemiplegia/Quadriplegia 342., 438.2, 438.3, 
438.4, 438.5, 344., 
781.4 
Faurot, et al.; Rosen, et 
al. 
Multiple Sclerosis 340, 341.0 Rosen, et al.  
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Cancer  140-165.9, 170-176.9, 
179-208.9 
Rosen, et al.  
Alzheimer’s Disease  290, 290.0, 290.1, 
290.2, 290.3, 331.0 
Rosen, et al.  
Dementia other than Alzheimer’s 290.4-290.43, 290.8, 
290.9, 291.1, 291.2, 
294, 294.1, 294.8 
Rosen, et al. 
Parkinson’s Disease 332-332.1 Rosen, et al.  
Seizure Disorder 345-345.5, 345.7-
345.9, 780.3 
Rosen, et al.  
 
Table 3.2. Clinical Indicators of Potentially Preventable  
Hospitalization 
 
Condition Source 
Diabetes Short-Term 
Complications 
AHRQ; Walsh, et al. 
Perforated Appendix AHRQ 
Diabetes Long-Term 
Complications 
AHRQ; Walsh, et al. 
COPD or Asthma AHRQ; Walsh, et al. 
Hypertension AHRQ 
Heart Failure AHRQ; Walsh, et al.  
Dehydration AHRQ; Walsh, et al. 
Bacterial Pneumonia AHRQ 
Urinary Tract Infection AHRQ 
Angina Without Procedure AHRQ 
Uncontrolled Diabetes AHRQ 
Lower-Extremity Amputation 
among Patients with Diabetes 
AHRQ 
Anemia Walsh, et al.  
Hypotension Walsh, et al. 
Constipation/Fecal 
Impaction/Obstipation 
Walsh, et al. 
Diarrhea Walsh, et al. 
C. Difficile Walsh, et al. 
Gastroenteritis with nausea or 
vomiting 
Walsh, et al. 
Cellulitis Walsh, et al. 
Skin Ulcers Including Pressure 
Ulcers 
Walsh, et al. 
Lower Respiratory: 
Pneumonia/Bronchitis 
Walsh, et al. 
Falls and Trauma Walsh, et al. 
Altered Mental Status/Acute 
Confusion/Delirium 
Walsh, et al. 
Psychosis, Severe Agitation, 
Organic Brain Syndrome 
Walsh, et al. 
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Weight Loss, Nutritional 
Deficiencies, Adult Failure to 
Thrive 
Walsh, et al. 
Seizures Walsh, et al. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MANUSCRIPT ONE 
 
EFFECTS OF LONG TERM CARE FACILITY RESIDENCY AND PAYER ON RISK 
OF POTENTIALLY PREVENTABLE HOSPITALIZATION AMONG FRAIL 
ELDERLY MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 Robertson, A.S., Probst, J.C., Bennett, K.J., Crouch, E., & Hardin, J.W. To be submitted to Journal of 
Aging and Health. 
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ABSTRACT  
 
Purpose. We sought to determine whether and to what extent provision of formal, 
residential long-term care and payor status were associated with potentially preventable 
hospitalizations (PPH) among frail Medicare beneficiaries over age 65. 
Methods. We conducted a retrospective cohort analysis that matched Medicare 
beneficiaries based on: (1) clinical indicators of functional decline; (2) number of chronic 
conditions; (3) diagnosis of Alzheimer’s or senility; (4) age group; (5) sex; and (6) race. 
The final cohorts (Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community; Medicare-only 
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities; Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible 
beneficiaries residing in the community; and Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible 
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities) included 1,096 beneficiaries each, for a 
total study sample of 4,384 individuals. Cohort status served as the independent variable. 
Our first analysis examined rates of PPH between the four cohorts, while our second 
analysis examined the relative risk of PPH between the four cohorts. We controlled 
additionally for state Medicaid bed hold policies, rurality of residence, and, among those 
residing in long-term care facilities, facility type.  
Results. Dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities had the lowest 
rates of PPH, while Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities had 
the highest rates of PPH. Dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities 
had a significantly lower risk of PPH than either Medicare-only residents of long-term 
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care facilities or dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community. State Medicaid 
bed hold policies were not associated with rates or risk of PPH. 
Conclusion. While this study did not succeed in elucidating an association between 
residential long-term care and PPH, it did identify patterns of PPH between frail elderly 
residents of long-term care facilities by payor status: specifically, Medicare-only 
residents of long-term care facilities are at significantly higher risk of PPH than their dual 
eligible counterparts, which could indicate differential responses to similar clinical 
conditions that could stem from payment policies.  
Background  
 
 As the aged population in this country grows, the number of individuals in need 
of long term care services and supports (LTCSS) will also continue to grow—and is 
expected to reach 9.6 million Americans aged 65 or older by 2030 (Lakdawalla & 
Phillipson, 2002; CBO, 2013). While need for LTCSS is not an inevitable result of aging, 
physical health does decline with age. Twenty percent of individuals aged seventy or 
older have some form of disability that impacts their ability to care for themselves. Up to 
fifty percent of individuals aged eighty-five and older having at least one such disability, 
which may require the use of LTCSS (Chappell & Cooke, 2016; WHO, 2006). 
Access to formal long-term care can be prohibitively expensive for many 
Americans.  The average cost of a one-month stay in an assisted living facility is $3,293, 
and the average cost of a month of nursing home care is $6,235 (USDHHS, 2016). As 
Medicare does not provide reimbursement for LTCSS outside of the post-acute setting 
(USDHHS, 2014; CMS, 2015), individuals in need of LTCSS must either pay for these 
services out of pocket (either directly or through the purchase of long-term care 
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insurance) or qualify for Medicaid-funded long-term care provision based on income and 
assets (Social Security Office of Retirement and Disability Policy, 2012; Brown & 
Finkelstein, 2006). Due in large part to the difficulties associated with paying out of 
pocket or gaining Medicaid eligibility, two-thirds of Americans in need of long-term care 
receive this care through exclusively informal means (such as utilizing unpaid care 
provided by family and friends).  An additional twenty-five percent receive care through 
a combination of informal, unpaid care and formal care—usually in the form of home and 
community-based services (HCBS) (Doty, 2010).  
 While informal caregiving—alone or combined with formal HCBS—is often 
regarded as an economical alternative to more formal, intensive LTCSS such as 
residential long-term care, it too comes with steep costs not only to recipients of care, but 
potentially to the health care system as a whole. Specifically, research has shown that 
recipients of informal LTCSS and HCBS—both of which can be understood as being less 
“comprehensive” than formal, residential long-term care—tend to have more unmet long-
term care needs than their peers who receive LTCSS in a comprehensive residential 
setting (Komisar, Feder, & Kasper, 2005). These unmet long-term care needs, in turn, 
have been consistently demonstrated to lead to poor health outcomes, particularly with 
regard to potentially preventable hospitalizations (PPH) (Walsh, et al., 2010; Wysocki, et 
al., 2014). Potential explanations for these outcomes includes a lack of assistance with 
managing chronic medical conditions (Allen & Mor, 1997), a lack of assistance with 
medication management (Kuzuya, 2008), and an increased likelihood of injury due to 
lack of mobility assistance and supervision (LaPlante, et al., 2004; Komisar, Feder, & 
Kasper, 2005). There is also evidence of increased rates of depression in the population 
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of frail elderly who have unmet long-term care needs (Allen & Mor, 1997), which has 
been shown to place older adults at increased risk of subsequent physical decline (Pennix, 
et al., 1998).  
 Recent evidence has caused some to question whether the current policy shift 
towards providing long-term care services through HCBS rather than residential settings 
is entirely prudent given the seeming shortfalls of HCBS and informal care in preventing 
unnecessary health decline and higher rates of PPH (Wysocki, et al., 2014; Konetzka, 
2014).  If it is true that individuals in need of long-term care fare better under the more 
comprehensive care received in a residential care setting than they do under the 
fragmented care characterized by many HCBS and informal care settings (Miller, Allen, 
& Mor, 2008; Freedman & Spillman, 2014), then a renewed focus on increasing access to 
comprehensive long-term care is in order. 
 Alongside studies demonstrating the likely role of comprehensive long-term care 
in reducing instances of PPH, however, are studies that indicate that two powerful market 
forces also affect PPH among long-term care recipients, based on payer status. First, 
many states have enacted bed-hold policies with the intent of protecting Medicaid 
beneficiaries by preventing the loss of their residential long-term care beds to more 
lucrative Medicare and private-pay patients. Intrator, et al. assert that these policies have 
created a powerful perverse incentive: if the marginal profit of holding a bed under 
Medicaid-reimbursed bed-hold policy is greater than the marginal profit of keeping the 
Medicaid patient in the facility, the facility has every incentive to hospitalize the 
Medicaid beneficiary, even if unnecessarily (Intrator, et al., 2007). Indeed, states with 
bed-hold policies of at least moderate generosity have been shown to have significantly 
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higher rates of transfer from nursing homes to hospitals than states without such policies 
(Intrator, et al., 2009). Bed-hold policies only affect twenty-seven states. Further, 
Medicaid long-term care beneficiaries who are also eligible for Medicare are typically 
eligible for more lucrative Medicare-funded post-acute care once they return to their 
original long-term care facility following a hospital stay of at least three days—a fact 
which some have suggested could encourage long-term care facilities to transfer 
Medicaid-funded residents to hospitals at higher rates than other residents (Grabowski, 
2007; Ouslander & Berenson, 2011).  
 Thus, while research has indicated that comprehensive care—as provided in 
residential long-term care facilities—is associated with lower rates of PPH, it has also 
shown that if that care is reimbursed by Medicaid, as opposed to privately funded, 
hospitalization rates will be higher. What we do not know—and what we seek to better 
understand through this research—is whether the protective effects of comprehensive, 
residential long-term care outweigh the disadvantages associated with Medicaid coverage 
of these services when it comes to PPH.  
Methods 
Data Sources 
 This study utilized data from the 5% sample of 2013 Medicare claims and 
enrollment data, provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
through the Research Data Assistance Center (ResDAC). A total of five 2013 Medicare 
claims and enrollment data files were used: the Base A/B/C/D segment of the Master 
Beneficiary Summary File; the Chronic Conditions segment of the Master Beneficiary 
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Summary File; the Part D segment of the Master Beneficiary Summary File; the 
MedPAR All file; and the Medicare Carrier Claims file.  
 In addition to these Medicare claims files, we used the Health Resources and 
Services Administration (HRSA) Area Health Resource File (AHRF) to determine the 
rurality of Medicare beneficiaries based on the Urban Influence Code tied to the 
individual beneficiary’s county of residence. A compilation of Medicaid bed-hold 
policies by state, authored by The National Long-Term Care Ombudsman Resource 
Center, was used to create a dichotomous variable for presence or absence of state bed-
hold policies (NLTCORC, 2012).  
Study Sample 
This study was limited to fee for service Medicare beneficiaries over the age of 
65. To ensure a full year of Medicare utilization, beneficiaries who were not aged 65 at 
the beginning of the study year were excluded, as were beneficiaries who died during the 
study year. In defining dual eligibility, only those beneficiaries who were dually eligible 
for both Medicare and Medicaid for the entire study year were counted. Further, only 
those full-year dual eligible beneficiaries who received full Medicaid benefits were 
counted as dual-eligible. Similarly, in defining Medicare-only beneficiaries, only those 
beneficiaries who were never eligible for either full or partial Medicaid benefits were 
counted. Beneficiaries for whom data as to Zip Code of residence, race, or sex were 
excluded. These exclusions resulted in an initial sample of 1,305,239 Medicare 
beneficiaries (1,160,930 Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community; 17,700 
Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in residential long-term care facilities; 98,916 
Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community; and 27,693 
47 
 
Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in residential long-term care 
facilities) to extract the matched cohorts. Individuals were considered to be “residents” of 
residential long-term care facilities if they had physician claims with a place of service in 
a long-term care facility for at least three consecutive quarters during the study year.  
Study Design  
Using a retrospective cohort analysis, we examined the risk of PPH between four 
matched cohorts: Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community; Medicare-only 
beneficiaries who were long-stay residents of a residential long-term care facility; 
Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries residing in the community; and 
Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries who were long-stay residents of a 
residential long-term care facility.  
Due to the potential for inherent selection biases in the data, it was necessary to 
reduce imbalance in the distribution of confounders between the base cohort group 
(Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries) and the other three cohorts (Stuart, 
2010). As research has indicated that the utilization of propensity scores to perform 
cohort matching increases the imbalance of unmeasured confounders (Brooks & 
Ohsfeldt, 2013; King & Nielsen, 2016), we chose instead to perform an exact matching 
methodology which utilized a fully blocked randomized experimental design (King & 
Nielsen, 2016).  
The selection of matching variables was based in part on the Gelberg-Andersen 
Behavioral Model for Vulnerable Populations (Gelberg, Andersen, & Leake, 2000). This 
model asserts that predisposing characteristics (i.e., demographic, social, and cultural 
factors) affect an individual’s enabling resources (i.e., financial and organizational 
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factors), which in turn affect need for health services (both perceived and evaluated need) 
and health outcomes (Babitsch, Gohl, & von Lengerke, 2012). In turn, both perceived and 
evaluated need for health services affect health behavior in the form of health practices 
and the use of health services, which affects health outcomes (Gelberg, Andersen, & 
Leake, 2000).  
 Age affects method of long-term care provision in that the older a Medicare 
beneficiary is, the more likely they are to need formal long-term care, as factors such as 
widowhood and the compounding of functional and medical decline increase with age 
(Branch & Jette, 1982; Spillman & Lubitz, 2000). Age also affects ability to self-insure, 
as long-term care insurance premiums increase significantly with age (AALTCI, 2016). 
Sex affects enabling resources as men are more likely to have informal long-term care 
provided by wives (Navaie-Waliser, Spriggs, & Feldman, 2002; Lakdawalla & Philipson, 
2002). Race and ethnicity affect enabling resources due to differential cultural norms 
between whites, African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians as to the burden of providing 
comprehensive informal care for an elderly relative, perceptions of duty to do so, as well 
as potential effects of discrimination on access to formal long-term care (Wallace, et al., 
1997; Dilworth-Anderson, Williams, & Gibson, 2002; Bradley, et al., 2002).   
To accommodate the variables elucidated above, we performed a 1:1:1:1 exact 
nearest neighbor match, without replacement (Kawabata, Tran, & Hines, 1999), matching 
on the following beneficiary-level characteristics: (1) clinical diagnosis of one, two, or 
three clinical indicators of functional decline; (2) number of chronic conditions (zero, 
one, or two or more); (3) diagnosis of Alzheimer’s or senility; (4) age (66-70; 71-75; 76-
80; 81-85; 86-90; 91 or older); (4) sex; and (5) race (white, non-Hispanic; African 
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American, non-Hispanic; Hispanic; Native American/Alaskan Indian; or Other). Clinical 
indicators of functional decline were based on a number of ICD-9 codes demonstrated by 
Faurot, et al. and Rosen, et al.), respectively, to be valid indicators of functional decline 
in elderly adults (Faurot, et al., 2015; Rosen, et al., 2000) (Table 4.1). Individuals were 
matched on the other four variables based on a review of the literature that showed these 
individual-level characteristics are most often associated with need for formal long-term 
care due to the interplay between age, the effects of chronic condition multi-morbidity on 
functional status, the effects of senility on functional status, and the effect of sex on 
frailty, independent of issues of longevity or spousal caregiver ability (Branch & Jette, 
1982; Boult, et al., 1994; Stuck, et al., 1999; Millan-Calenti, et al., 2010; Tas, et al., 2007; 
Marengoni, et al., 2009; Cawthon, et al., 2007).  
The goal of the matching methodology was to ensure that the four study cohorts 
were similar in terms of characteristics that are known to affect need for long-term care. 
We used Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care 
residential facilities as our base cohort under the theory that individuals in this group 
were the most likely to be in need of residential long-term care, as eligibility for 
Medicaid coverage of residential long-term care requires considerable documentation 
(Grabowski, 2007). The final study sample consisted of four matched study cohorts of 
1,096 Medicare beneficiaries each, for a total study sample of 4,384 individuals (Table 
4.3). Contrary to Fossett & Burke, we believe than any index of Medicaid generosity in 
long-term care must account not only for demand-side aspects of Medicaid long-term 
care policy, but also supply-side aspects, including the effects of the market incentives 
we have discussed above (Fossett & Burke, 2010).  
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Independent Variable: Cohort Status 
 The independent variable, cohort status, was designed to measure the interaction 
between long-term care payer type (private pay versus Medicaid coverage) and place of 
residence (community versus residential long-term care setting). Medicare-only 
beneficiaries residing in residential long-term care facilities for this amount of time 
would be unlikely to have their long-term care services covered by Medicare due to the 
time-limited nature of Medicare post-acute payment for long-term care services, and 
would thus be paying for these services privately, either directly out of pocket or through 
a long-term care insurance benefit.  
Dependent Variable: Potentially Preventable Hospitalization 
 The dependent variable was occurrence of a PPH. In defining a PPH in the elderly 
population, we began by including twelve of the fourteen Prevention Quality Indicators 
designated by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality as “ambulatory care 
sensitive conditions,” excluding “low birth weight’ and “asthma in younger adults.” 
(Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2012). In addition, recognizing that PPH 
among frail older adults who require long-term care can encompass conditions that would 
not be considered PPH in younger, healthier populations, we also included conditions 
identified by a technical expert panel on PPH among dual-eligible beneficiaries who 
require long-term care. A list of all conditions for which hospitalization was defined as a 
PPH, and their accompanying ICD-9 codes, can be found in Table 4.2.   
Covariates 
 For the regression analyses, control variables included state Medicaid bed-hold 
policy (yes/no), rurality of residence (rural versus urban), and within the two cohorts 
51 
 
representing residents of long-term care facilities, facility type (assisted living facility; 
custodial care facility; skilled nursing facility; or nursing facility), at the beneficiary 
level.  While the effects of regional practice patterns and state-level Medicaid policies 
beyond bed-hold policy quite likely affect PPH in this population, we lacked the 
statistical power to control for either Hospital Referral Region or state. Further, the 
complexity of differences in Medicaid policies from state to state preclude an accurate 
grouping of states by long-term care Medicaid generosity.  
Analytical Approach 
 Wald chi-square tests (α = 0.05) assessed differences in PPH by cohort status and 
covariate. Modified Poisson regression models estimated the relative risk of PPH among 
our four matched cohorts, as well as between the two cohorts representing residents of 
long-term care facilities, respectively, with dual-eligible beneficiaries residing in long-
term care facilities as our referent. As our matching methodology had already controlled 
for clinical indicators of frailty, number of chronic conditions, Alzheimer’s/senility 
status, age, sex, and race/ethnicity, we did not control for these covariates in the adjusted 
model. A separate analysis of these variables using modified Poisson regression modeling 
confirmed that the inclusion of these matching variables as control variables had no effect 
on other variables in the model. The statistical analyses were conducted using SAS 
statistical software, version 9.3 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC).  
Results  
Unadjusted Rates of PPH 
 Table 4.4 displays the unadjusted rates of PPH, as well as unadjusted odds of 
PPH. Dual eligible beneficiaries who resided in a long-term care facility had the lowest 
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rates of PPH among the four matched cohorts, while Medicare-only beneficiaries who 
resided in long-term care facilities had the highest rates of PPH. Other factors associated 
with higher rates of PPH include sex (with females having higher rates of PPH than 
males), and rurality (with rural individuals having higher rates of PPH than their urban 
counterparts). Individuals with two or more chronic conditions had significantly higher 
rates of PPH than individuals with no chronic conditions, and individuals with a 
diagnosis or Alzheimer’s or other form of dementia had considerably higher rates of PPH 
than did individuals without such a diagnosis. Residents of assisted living facilities and 
custodial care facilities were significantly less likely to have a PPH than were residents of 
skilled nursing facilities; there was no statistical difference in likelihood of PPH between 
residents of skilled nursing facilities and residents of nursing facilities or beneficiaries 
residing in the community. Factors that were not associated with PPH in the bivariate 
analysis were age and race. Further, the presence of a state Medicaid bed hold policy was 
not associated with rate of PPH.  
Adjusted Risk of PPH 
 Multivariate modified Poisson regression modeling estimated the relative risk of 
PPH in the study population. To better elucidate the effects of the covariates on risk of 
PPH, seven models were performed: three examining the effects of cohort status, state 
Medicaid bed-hold policies, and rurality, successively, among all four cohorts, and four 
examining the effects of cohort status, state Medicaid bed-hold policies, rurality, and type 
of residential facility, successively, among beneficiaries residing in long-term care 
facilities (Tables 4.5 and 4.6).  
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The first analysis examined the risk of PPH by cohort status alone among all four 
cohorts, and reflects the information provided in Table 4.4. In the first model, the cohort 
of Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities had the highest risk of 
PPH (RR 1.31, p=0.0056) when compared to the cohort of dual eligible beneficiaries 
residing in long-term care facilities, followed by the cohort of dual eligible beneficiaries 
who resided in the community (RR 1.24, p = 0.0301). The second and third models, 
which controlled for state bed-hold policies and state bed-hold policies as well as rurality, 
respectively, had very little effect on risk of PPH across the four study cohorts, with the 
final model demonstrating a 34% higher risk of PPH for Medicare-only LTC facility 
residents relative to dual eligible LTC facility residents (p = 0.0030), and a 25% higher 
risk of PPH for dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community compared to dual 
eligible LTC facility residents (p = 0.0239).  
 In the next analysis, we restricted our examination to residents of LTC facilities. 
Models 4 through 6 present relative risk by cohort, sequentially adding state bed-hold 
policies and rurality (Table 4.6). In all models in this analysis, Medicare-only 
beneficiaries residing in residential long-term care facilities had a significantly higher 
risk of PPH than did Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in residential 
long-term care facilities.  
The final model, which controlled for the additional variable of type of long-term 
care facility, demonstrated a considerably higher relative risk of PPH among Medicare-
only LTC facility residents relative to dual eligible LTC facility residents (RR 1.53, p 
<.0001).  This final model also showed a significantly higher risk of PPH among 
residents of nursing home (skilled nursing facilities and nursing facilities), compared to 
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residents of assisted living facilities (RR 3.03 for residents of skilled nursing facilities, 
and RR 2.61 for residents of nursing facilities).  
Discussion  
 The results of our study suggest that dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-
term care facilities are significantly less likely than both Medicare-only LTC facility 
residents and dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community to have a PPH, and, 
further, that the risk of PPH among Medicare-only LTC facility residents is 53% higher 
than the risk of PPH among dual eligible LTC facility residents after accounting for the 
type of long-term care facility in which beneficiaries reside. 
Given that most state Medicaid policies are more likely to cover nursing home 
care than care in assisted living facilities, yet assisted living facilities are considerably 
more affordable—particularly when paying out of pocket—it is not surprising that 82.1% 
of dual-eligible long-term care facility residents resided in a nursing facility of some 
form, while only 40.4% of Medicare-only long-term care facility residents residing in a 
nursing facility, with 59.6% of that population residing in assisted living facilities or 
custodial care facilities (See Table 4.3). The finding that residents of skilled nursing 
facilities were at a three-fold risk of PPH compared to residents of assisted living 
facilities—and that residents of nursing facilities had a PPH risk level of two and a half 
times that of assisted living facility residents, however, argues against the hypothesis on 
which this research was based. If comprehensiveness of care reduced risk of PPH, we 
would expect residents of facilities providing less comprehensive care—i.e., assisted 
living and custodial care facilities—to have a higher risk of PPH than residents receiving 
comprehensive nursing and medical care alongside personal assistance. As our findings 
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demonstrate the opposite, further research will be necessary to better understand the 
association between type of long-term care facility and risk of PPH. It is likely that 
residents of nursing facilities and skilled nursing facilities are sicker than residents of 
assisted living and custodial care facilities in ways for which we were unable to account 
in our matching methodology.  
Although the results of this research did not succeed in identifying the effects of 
place of residence (community versus long-term care facility), our study did elucidate 
patterns of PPH between frail elderly residents of long-term care facilities by payer 
status. Controlling through either matching methodology or regression analysis for a 
number of covariates, we have found that the significantly higher risk of PPH we have 
ascertained among Medicare-only LTC facility residents cannot be attributed to frailty 
level (as measured by clinical indicators of frailty), race/ethnicity, Alzheimer’s/senility 
status, age, sex, rurality of residence, or state Medicaid bed-hold policy.  
Although we lacked the statistical power to control for regional practice patterns 
or state-level policies beyond presence of a state Medicaid bed-hold policy, the fact that 
state bed-hold policies were found to be insignificant in predicting risk of PPH indicates 
that suspected perverse incentives towards increased unnecessary hospitalizations among 
Medicaid long-term care residents may not be a significant factor in risk of PPH in the 
population of frail elderly. These findings contradict those of researchers who have found 
positive correlations between hospitalization and state Medicaid bed-hold policies 
(Intrator, et al., 2007; Intrator, et al., 2009; Grabowski, et al., 2010; Unruh, 2013). The 
most recent previous research of the effects of Medicaid bed-hold policies on 
hospitalization used data collected between the years 2000 and 2005, so it is possible that 
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facilities have adjusted appropriately to the perverse incentives inherent in bed-hold 
policies in the intervening time between 2005 and the year of our study, 2013. It is also 
possible that the findings of previous researchers could be attributed to large sample 
sizes, as sample sizes for these studies were 22 million person-quarters for Unruh, et al.’s 
study, and 3.3 million observations for Grabowski, et al.’s study, respectively. More 
research will be necessary to determine whether and to what extent other regional, state, 
and national policies may affect risk of PPH in this population, as well as to understand 
what other factors could be contributing to the significant differences in risk of PPH, 
particularly between the two cohorts representing LTC facility residents.  
While a PPH is indicative of a lack of appropriate preventive and ameliorative 
care leading up to the preventable hospitalization, and while we feel that the most likely 
explanation of our findings hinges on issues of policy, we cannot discount the possibility 
that in some cases a PPH may be the preferred outcome, such that a lack of PPH may be 
indicative of untreated conditions that would require a PPH admission to properly treat. 
Specifically, it is possible that potential differences in treatment of private pay long-term 
care residents as compared to residents for whom care is reimbursed by Medicaid, such 
as differences in facility quality and availability of patient advocates, could help to 
explain the significantly lower risk of PPH among the dual eligible LTC resident 
population. Further analysis will be aimed at examining specific types of PPH by payer 
status and long-term care facility type.  
Limitations  
 This study was limited by a relatively small sample size, which not only 
prevented us from controlling for state of residence—which would have allowed us some 
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ability to broadly measure the effects of Medicaid and other long-term care policies 
specific to each state—but also prevented us from controlling for regional differences in 
practice patterns based on Hospital Referral Regions. Our sample size of 4,384 also did 
not provide us with a large enough sample to subset race or ethnicity by more than two 
levels. 
 Our study was also partially limited by our reliance, of necessity, on clinical 
indicators of frailty to match members of the other three cohorts to the dual eligible 
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities. Information regarding the utilization of 
oxygen, hospital beds, and mobility devices was only available for community-dwelling 
beneficiaries. Thus, while the cohorts are well matched in terms of frailty and potential 
need for long-term care, information as to DME use among all cohort members would 
have strengthened our study.  
 Finally, as our study analyzed only Medicare claims data, we only had 
information pertaining to home health services reimbursed by Medicare, and did not have 
information as to the home health or other supportive services utilized by either 
Medicare-only or dual-eligible beneficiaries residing in the community. This information 
would have been a powerful covariate to consider in our successive Poisson regression 
modeling.  
Conclusion  
 Our findings suggest that dual eligible residents of LTC facilities are at a 
significantly lower risk of PPH than their similarly situated counterparts who are either 
Medicare-only residents of LTC facilities or dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the 
community.  The reasons for the significant differences in risk of PPH—particularly 
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between Medicare-only residents of LTC facilities and dual eligible LTC facility 
residents—is not readily apparent, and cannot be explained by a number of covariates 
associated in the literature with PPH. It seems likely that variables that could not be 
controlled for in our model—particularly regional practice patterns and state-level 
policies, but also potential differences in quality of care linked to payer status—may help 
to explain our findings. 
Table 4.1. Clinical Indicators of Functional Decline, with sources 
Condition ICD-9 Code(s) Source 
DM Complications 250.4, 250.6, 250.7, 250.9 Faurot, et al. 
Podiatric Care 700., 703., 681.1 Faurot, et al. 
Heart Failure 428., 425., 429.0, 429.1, 429.3, 429.4 Faurot, et al. 
Sepsis 01., 036. 038., 040.0, 041., 032.0, 
032.1, 681.,682., 730., 031.0, 031.2, 
790.7, 032.82, 032.83, 053.0, 053.13, 
054.5, 136.3, 320.0, 785.4, 112.83, 
112.81, 112.5 
Faurot, et al. 
Difficult Walking 719.7, 781.2, 781.3, 438.85, v46.3 Faurot, et al. 
Stroke/Brain Injury 348., 430., 431., 432., 852., 853., 854., 
349.82, 433.01, 433.11, 433.21, 433.31, 
433.91, 434.01, 434.11, 434.91 
Faurot, et al. 
Weakness 728.2, 728.87, 799.3, 728.2, 728.3, 
v49.84 
Faurot, et al. 
Decubitus Ulcer/Pressure Ulcer 707.0, 707.2, 707. Faurot, et al.; Rosen, et al. 
Paralysis/Hemiplegia/Quadriplegia 342., 438.2, 438.3, 438.4, 438.5, 344., 
781.4 
Faurot, et al.; Rosen, et al. 
Multiple Sclerosis 340, 341.0 Rosen, et al. 
Cancer 140-165.9, 170-176.9, 179-208.9 Rosen, et al. 
Alzheimer’s Disease 290, 290.0, 290.1, 290.2, 290.3, 331.0 Rosen, et al. 
Dementia other than Alzheimer’s 290.4-290.43, 290.8, 290.9, 291.1, 
291.2, 294, 294.1, 294.8 
Rosen, et al. 
Parkinson’s Disease 332-332.1 Rosen, et al. 
Seizure Disorder 345-345.5, 345.7-345.9, 780.3 Rosen, et al. 
 
Table 4.2. Indicators of Potentially Preventable  
Hospitalizations, with sources 
 
Condition Source 
Diabetes Short-Term Complications AHRQ; Walsh, et al. 
Perforated Appendix AHRQ 
Diabetes Long-Term Complications AHRQ; Walsh, et al. 
COPD or Asthma AHRQ; Walsh, et al. 
Hypertension AHRQ 
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Heart Failure AHRQ; Walsh, et al. 
Dehydration AHRQ; Walsh, et al. 
Bacterial Pneumonia AHRQ 
Urinary Tract Infection AHRQ 
Angina Without Procedure AHRQ 
Uncontrolled Diabetes AHRQ 
Lower-Extremity Amputation among 
Patients with Diabetes 
AHRQ 
Anemia Walsh, et al.  
Hypotension Walsh, et al.  
Constipation/Fecal 
Impaction/Obstipation 
Walsh, et al.  
Diarrhea/Gastroenteritis Walsh, et al.  
C. Difficile Walsh, et al.  
Cellulitis Walsh, et al.  
Skin Ulcers Including Pressure Ulcer Walsh, et al.  
Lower Respiratory: 
Pneumonia/Bronchitis 
Walsh, et al.  
Falls and Trauma Walsh, et al.  
Altered Mental Status/Acute 
Confusion/Delirium 
Walsh, et al.  
Psychosis, Severe Agitation, Organic 
Brain Syndrome 
Walsh, et al.  
Weight Loss, Nutritional Deficiencies, 
Adult Failure to Thrive 
Walsh, et al.  
Seizures Walsh, et al.  
 
Table 4.3. Characteristics of Study Cohorts, 2013 Medicare Claims Files, CMS 
 Medicare Only, 
Community-
Dwelling 
Medicare Only, 
LTC Resident 
Dual Eligible, 
Community 
Dwelling 
Dual Eligible, LTC 
Resident 
Percentage 
Total 1096 1096 1096 1096 100% 
Sex*      
Male 346 346 346 346 31.6% 
Female 750 750 750 750 68.4% 
Age Group*      
66-70 109 109 109 109 9.9% 
71-75 119 119 119 119 10.9% 
76-80 171 171 171 171 15.6% 
81-85 244 244 244 244 22.3% 
86-90 232 232 232 232 21.2% 
91+ 221 221 221 221 20.2% 
Race*      
White, Non-Hispanic 943 943 943 943 86.0% 
Non-White, or White, 
Hispanic 
153 153 153 153 14.0% 
Rurality*      
Urban 916 916 916 916 83.6% 
Rural 180 180 180 180 16.4% 
Alzheimer’s/Senility*      
No 362 362 362 362 33.0% 
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Yes 734 734 734 734 67.0% 
Chronic Condition 
Number* 
     
0 20 20 20 20 1.8% 
1 126 126 126 126 11.5% 
2+ 950 950 950 950 86.7% 
Bed Hold Policy**      
No  409 (37.3%) 452 (41.2%) 323 (29.5%) 358 (32.7%)  
Yes 687 (62.7%) 644 (58.8%) 773 (70.5%) 738 (67.3%)  
Type of Long-Term Care 
Facility** 
     
None/Community 
Resident 
1096 (100%) 0 1096 (100%) 0  
Assisted Living 0 515 (47.0%) 0 132 (12.0%)  
Custodial Care 0 138 (12.6%) 0 64 (5.8%)  
Nursing Facility 0 405 (37.0%) 0 864 (78.8%)  
Skilled Nursing Facility 0 38 (3.5%) 0 36 (3.3%)  
*Indicates matching variable; **Indicates control variable 
Table 4.4. Unadjusted Rate of Potentially Preventable Hospitalization, 2013, Medicare 
Claims Data, CMS 
 
 % PPH p-value Unadjusted Odds Ratio 
Cohort     
Medicare Only, Community-Dwelling 16.70 0.0392 1.235 (0.978-1.560) 
Medicare Only, LTC Resident 18.34  1.384 (1.100-1.741) 
Dual Eligible, Community-Dwelling 17.34  1.292 (1.025-1.629) 
Dual Eligible, LTC Resident  13.96  Reference 
Sex    
Male 14.88 0.0400 Reference 
Female 17.37  1.202 (1.008-1.432) 
Age Group    
66-70 15.14 0.8216 Reference 
71-75 15.76  1.049 (0.732-1.502) 
76-80 17.84  1.217 (0.878-1.688) 
81-85 16.39  1.099 (0.805-1.502) 
86-90 17.35  1.177 (0.861-1.608) 
91+ 16.18  1.082 (0.788-1.486) 
Race    
White, Non-Hispanic 16.83 0.2663 Reference 
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Non-White, or White, Hispanic 15.03  0.874 (0.689-1.108) 
Rurality    
Urban 15.91 0.0126 Reference 
Rural 19.49  1.841 (1.528-2.218) 
Alzheimer’s/Senility    
No 11.40 <.0001 Reference 
Yes 19.14  1.280 (1.054-1.554) 
Chronic Condition Number    
0 1.25 <.0001 Reference 
1 2.78  2.256 (0.293-17.395) 
2+ 18.74  18.209 (2.530-131.057) 
Bed Hold Policy    
No  16.6 0.9803 Reference 
Yes 16.57  0.998 (0.845-1.179) 
Type of Long-Term Care Facility  <.0001  
Skilled Nursing Facility     Reference  
None (Community) 7.47  0.706 (0.474-1.050) 
Assisted Living Facility 9.85  0.278 (0.141-0.550) 
Custodial Care Facility 22.52  0.376 (0.207-0.685) 
Nursing Facility 17.25  0.717 (0.480-1.073) 
                
   Table 4.5. Adjusted Relative Risk of Potentially Preventable  
               Hospitalization, by Cohort Status, All Cohorts, 2013, Medicare 
               Claims Data, CMS  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Cohort     
Medicare Only, 
Community-
Dwelling 
1.20 1.20 1.22 
Medicare Only, 
LTC Resident 
1.31* 1.31* 1.34* 
Dual Eligible, 
Community-
Dwelling 
1.24* 1.24* 1.25* 
Dual Eligible, 
LTC Resident  
Ref Ref Ref 
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Bed Hold Policy    
No   Ref Ref 
Yes  1.01 1.02 
Rurality    
Urban   Ref 
Rural   1.25* 
                *= p <.05; ** = p <.0001 
Table 4.6. Adjusted Relative Risk of Potentially Preventable 
 Hospitalization, by Cohort Status, 2013, Medicare Claims Data, CMS  
 
  Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 Model 7  
Cohort      
Medicare 
Only, LTC 
Resident 
1.31* 1.32* 1.35* 1.53** 
Dual Eligible, 
LTC Resident  
Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Bed Hold 
Policy 
    
No   Ref Ref Ref 
Yes  1.06 1.07 1.10 
Rurality     
Urban   Ref Ref 
Rural   1.29* 1.24 
Facility Type     
Assisted 
Living 
   Ref 
Custodial Care    1.26 
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Skilled 
Nursing 
Facility 
   3.03* 
Nursing 
Facility 
   2.61* 
            *= p <.05; ** = p <.0001
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CHAPTER 5 
 
MANUSCRIPT TWO 
 
EFFECTS OF LONG TERM CARE FACILITY RESIDENCY AND PAYER ON 
TOTAL MEDICARE EXPENDITURES AMONG FRAIL ELDERLY MEDICARE 
BENEFICIARIES1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 Robertson, A.S., Bennett, K.J., Probst, J.C., Crouch, E., & Hardin, J.W. To be submitted to Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy, and Law. 
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ABSTRACT  
 
Purpose. We sought to determine whether and to what extent provision of formal, 
residential long-term care and payor status were associated with Medicare expenditure 
patterns among frail Medicare beneficiaries over age 65. 
Methods. We conducted a retrospective cohort analysis that matched Medicare 
beneficiaries based on: (1) clinical indicators of functional decline; (2) number of chronic 
conditions; (3) diagnosis of Alzheimer’s or senility; (4) age group; (5) sex; and (6) race. 
The final cohorts (Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community; Medicare-only 
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities; Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible 
beneficiaries residing in the community; and Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible 
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities) included 1,096 beneficiaries each, for a 
total study sample of 4,384 individuals. Cohort status served as the independent variable. 
Our first analysis examined median per capita Medicare beneficiaries by cohort status, 
while our second analysis examined risk of being “high cost” Medicare beneficiaries (i.e., 
having expenditures in the 90th percentile of Medicare expenditures). We controlled 
additionally for state Medicaid bed hold policies, rurality of residence, and, among those 
residing in long-term care facilities, facility type.  
Results. Dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities had a significantly 
lower risk of being “high cost” than did Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in long-
term care facilities or dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community. However, 
dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities had significantly higher per 
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capita expenditures than Medicare-only long-term care facility residents. State Medicaid 
bed hold policies were not associated with Medicare expenditures. 
Conclusion. While this study did not succeed in elucidating an association between 
residential long-term care and Medicare expenditures in general, they do suggest that 
dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities are less costly to the 
Medicare system than dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community. The finding 
that Medicare-only long term care facility residents have lower per capita Medicare 
expenditures than their dual eligible counterparts, yet are at greater risk of being “high 
cost” beneficiaries may suggest patterns of higher-intensity medical care for Medicare-
only residents of long-term care facilities compared to their dual eligible peers.  
Background  
 In recent years, the focus of American long-term care policy—particularly 
Medicaid long-term care policy—has shifted away from residential care and towards the 
provision of long-term care services and supports (LTCSS) through home and 
community based services (HCBS) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012). Similarly, as 
Medicare does not provide reimbursement for long-term care outside of the post-acute 
setting, individuals who are not eligible for Medicaid long-term care coverage are relying 
more and more on informal home and community-based care, including care provided 
without direct costs most often by family members. While this “rebalancing” of long-
term care towards informal and community-based services is often viewed as an 
economically efficient, it is possible that a focus away from comprehensive long-term 
care merely shifts costs to the Medicare system, as unmet long-term care needs have the 
potential to increase healthcare utilization, and thus expenditures.  
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Research suggests that recipients of informal or formal community-based long-
term care are more likely to have unmet long-term care needs than their counterparts 
receiving LTCSS in residential facilities (Freedman & Spillman, 2014). Further, these 
unmet long-term care needs have been associated with increased incidence of all-cause 
hospitalizations, ED visits, and physician visits (Walsh, et al., 2010; Sands, et al., 2006; 
Huiping, et al., 2012; Kuzuya et al., 2008; Quail, Wolfson, & Lippman, 2011;  Hass, et 
al., 2015; Kuzuya, 2006). Reasons for these negative outcomes include a lack of 
assistance with managing chronic medical conditions (Allen & Mor, 1997), a lack of 
assistance with medication management (Kuzuya, 2008) increased likelihood of 
accidental injury (LaPlante, et al., 2004; Komisar, Feder, & Kasper, 2005), and increased 
rates of depression in the population of frail elderly who have unmet long-term care 
needs (Allen & Mor, 1997), which has been shown to put older adults at increased risk of 
subsequent physical decline (Pennix, et al., 1998). Thus, we might assume that Medicare 
beneficiaries in need of long-term care who reside in the community will have higher 
total Medicare costs than Medicare beneficiaries in need of long term care who reside in 
residential long-term care facilities. Unfortunately, however, the long-term care policy 
landscape is more complicated than this. 
Specifically, in attempting to understand health care costs among elderly 
individuals in need of long-term care, we must consider not only type of care in terms of 
residential setting, but also type of care in terms of payer context.  There is a growing 
body of literature that asserts an association between payer type and health outcomes and 
utilization—an association that is influenced by policies at the local, state, and national 
level. Researchers have identified two market forces that incentivize the utilization of 
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Medicare-funded acute care services by dual eligible beneficiaries receiving Medicaid-
funded long-term care in residential facilities. First, the existence of state Medicaid bed-
hold policies has been demonstrated to increase hospitalization rates among not only 
Medicaid beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities, but also to a smaller extent 
among Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in such care facilities (Intrator, 2007; 
Grabowski, 2010). In addition, Medicaid long-term care beneficiaries who are also 
eligible for Medicare are typically eligible for more lucrative Medicare-funded post-acute 
care once they return to their original long-term care facility following a hospital stay of 
at least three days. This policy creates a clear incentive to hospitalize Medicaid 
beneficiaries unnecessarily, and at potentially considerable costs to the Medicare system, 
in order not only to avoid utilizing nursing home resources to care for a sick patient, but 
also to ensure considerably higher reimbursement rates for care provided as the patient 
recovers from his or her illness (Grabowski, 2007; Ouslander & Berenson, 2011).  
Wysocki, et al.’s finding that elderly users of formal home and community based 
long-term care services were at increased risk of both potentially preventable 
hospitalizations and non-potentially preventable hospitalizations compared to elderly 
nursing home residents with similar levels of physical and medical decline provides 
insight into differences in avoidable hospitalizations between dual eligible beneficiaries 
by type of long-term care (Wysocki, 2014). However, a thorough understanding of 
elderly long-term care policy requires an examination not only of those Medicare 
beneficiaries whose LTCSS are covered by Medicaid, but also those beneficiaries who 
either pay for LTCSS out of pocket or who rely solely on informal care. Our research 
seeks to shed light on the interplay between the seeming protective effects of 
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comprehensive, residential care on one hand and, on the other, the effects of perverse 
incentives towards unnecessary health care utilization by residents of long-term care 
facilities for whom care is reimbursed by Medicaid on the other.  We address these 
questions by examining expenditures across four cohorts of Medicare beneficiaries, 
characterized by residence and payor status, matched based on likely health care need.  
Methods 
Data Sources 
We obtained a 5% sample of 2013 Medicare claims and enrollment data from the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). This study utilized five 2013 
Medicare claims and enrollment data files: the Base A/B/C/D segment of the Master 
Beneficiary Summary File; the Chronic Conditions segment of the Master Beneficiary 
Summary File; the Part D segment of the Master Beneficiary Summary File; the 
MedPAR All file; and the Medicare Carrier Claims file. We linked the Medicare claims 
data to the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) Area Health Resource 
File (AHRF) to determine the rurality of Medicare beneficiaries based on the Urban 
Influence Codes. We created a dichotomous variable for presence of a state Medicaid 
bed-hold policy (yes/no) using a compilation of Medicaid bed-hold policies by state 
published by The National Long-Term Care Ombudsman Resource Center (NLTCORC, 
2012).  
Study Sample 
 We limited our study population to fee for service Medicare beneficiaries over the 
age of 65. To ensure each beneficiary studied had a full year of Medicare utilization 
available for analysis, beneficiaries who were not aged 65 at the beginning of the study 
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year were excluded, as were beneficiaries who died during the year. In defining dual 
eligibility, only those beneficiaries who were dually eligible for both Medicare and 
Medicaid for the entire study year were counted. Further, only those full-year dual 
eligible beneficiaries who received full Medicaid benefits were counted as dual-eligible. 
In defining Medicare-only beneficiaries, only those beneficiaries who were never eligible 
for either full or partial Medicaid benefits were counted. Beneficiaries for whom data as 
to Zip Code of residence, race, or sex were excluded. Individuals were classified as 
“residents” of long-term care facilities if they had physician claims (drawn from the 
Carrier Claims file) with a place of service in a long-term care facility for at least three 
consecutive quarters during the study year.  
 Our final study population of four matched cohorts of 1,096 Medicare 
beneficiaries each (or 4,384 total Medicare beneficiaries) was drawn from a final study 
sample of 1.3 million Medicare beneficiaries (1,160,930 Medicare-only beneficiaries 
residing in the community; 17,700 Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in residential 
long-term care facilities; 98,916 Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in 
the community; and 27,693 Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in 
residential long-term care facilities).  
Study Design  
Using a retrospective cohort analysis, we examined median Medicare 
expenditures and estimated log-transformed total Medicare costs, as well as risk of 
having Medicare expenditures in the top 90th percentile of all Medicare beneficiaries with 
expenditures (i.e., of being “high cost” Medicare beneficiaries). Beneficiaries were sorted 
into four matched cohorts: Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community; 
71 
 
Medicare-only beneficiaries who were long-stay residents of a residential long-term care 
facility; Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries residing in the community; and 
Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries who were long-stay residents of a 
residential long-term care facility. Characteristics of these cohorts are displayed in Table 
5.1. 
Due to the potential for selection bias, we sought to reduce the imbalance in the 
distribution of confounders between our base cohort group (Medicare/Medicaid dual 
eligible beneficiaries) and our three cohorts (Stuart, 2010). As research indicates that 
propensity score matching can increase the imbalance of unmeasured confounders 
(Brooks & Ohsfeldt, 2013; King & Nielson, 2016), our study employed an exact 
matching methodology, utilizing a fully blocked randomized experimental design (King 
& Nielson, 2016).  
We based our selection of variables on which to perform this matching in part on 
the Gelberg-Andersen Behavioral Model for Vulnerable Populations (Gelberg, Andersen, 
& Leake, 2000). The Gelberg-Andersen Model asserts that predisposing characteristics 
(i.e., demographic, social, and cultural factors) affect an individual’s enabling resources 
(i.e., financial and organizational factors), which affect need for health services (both 
perceived and evaluated need) and health outcomes (Babitsch, Gohl, & von Lengerke, 
2012). In turn, both perceived and evaluated need for health services affect health 
behavior in the form of health practices and the use of health services, which affects 
health outcomes (Gelberg, Andersen, & Leake, 2000).  
We performed a 1:1:1:1 exact nearest neighbor match, without replacement 
(Kawabata, Tran, & Hines, 1999), matching on the following beneficiary-level 
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characteristics: (1) clinical diagnosis of one, two, or three clinical indicators of functional 
decline; (2) number of chronic conditions (zero, one, or two or more); (3) diagnosis of 
Alzheimer’s or senility; (4) age (66-70; 71-75; 76-80; 81-85; 86-90; 91 or older); (4) sex; 
and (5) race (white, non-Hispanic; African American, non-Hispanic; Hispanic; Native 
American/Alaskan Indian; or Other). Clinical indicators of functional decline were based 
on a number of ICD-9 codes demonstrated by Faurot, et al., and Rosen, et al., 
respectively, to be valid indicators of functional decline in elderly adults (Faurot, et al., 
2015; Rosen, et al., 2000) (Table 4.1). Individuals were matched on the other four 
variables based on a review of the literature that showed these individual-level 
characteristics are most often associated with need for formal long-term care due to the 
interplay between age, the effects of chronic condition multi-morbidity on functional 
status, the effects of senility on functional status, and the effect of sex on frailty, 
independent of issues of longevity or spousal caregiver ability (Branch & Jette, 1982; 
Boult, et al., 1994; Stuck, et al., 1999; Millan-Calenti, et al., 2010; Tas, et al., 2007; 
Marengoni, et al., 2009; Cawthon, et al., 2007).  
Independent Variable: Cohort Status 
 Our independent variable, cohort status, was designed to measure the interaction 
between long-term care payer type (private pay versus Medicaid coverage) and place of 
residence (community versus residential long-term care setting). In order to be classified 
as a long-term resident of a long-term care facility, beneficiaries must have had physician 
claims with a place of service code in a long-term care facility (defined as an assisted 
living facility, custodial care facility, nursing facility, or skilled nursing facility) for three 
consecutive quarters during the study year.  
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Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable in the bivariate analysis was median per capita Medicare 
expenditures. The dependent variable in the Poisson regression analysis was membership 
in the 90th percentile of Medicare expenditures. The dependent variable in the generalized 
linear model analyses was the log-transformed total Medicare expenditures per 
beneficiary. We analyzed the log transformed total expenditures due to skewness in the 
data (Skewness Statistic 2.806). The dependent variable in the Poisson regression 
analyses was a beneficiary’s status as having Medicare expenditures in the top 90th 
percentile of all Medicare beneficiaries with expenditures during the study year. We 
analyzed the entire 5% sample of Medicare beneficiaries’ claims data to determine that 
the 90th percentile of expenditures for Medicare beneficiaries with at least $1 in Medicare 
expenditures was $22,081 per capita. Thus, individuals in our study population whose 
annual Medicare expenditures were greater than this amount were considered “high cost” 
Medicare beneficiaries 
Covariates 
 For the regression analyses, we controlled for state Medicaid bed-hold policy 
(yes/no), rurality of residence (rural versus urban), and, within the two cohorts 
representing residents of long-term care facilities, facility type (assisted living facility; 
custodial care facility; skilled nursing facility; or nursing facility), at the beneficiary 
level.  While we acknowledge that the effects of regional practice patterns and state-level 
Medicaid policies beyond bed-hold policy quite likely healthcare expenditures in this 
population, we lacked the statistical power to control for either Hospital Referral Region 
or state.  
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Analytical Approach 
 Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA on ranks tests (α = 0.05) assessed differences in 
median per capita Medicare expenditures by cohort status, as well as by level of covariate 
within each cohort. Modified Poisson regression models estimated the relative risk of 
membership in the top 90th percentile or “high cost” group of Medicare beneficiaries, 
among our four matched cohorts, as well as between the two cohorts representing 
residents of long-term care facilities, respectively, with dual-eligible beneficiaries 
residing in long-term care facilities as our referent. As our matching methodology had 
already controlled for clinical indicators of frailty, number of chronic conditions, 
Alzheimer’s/senility status, age, sex, and race/ethnicity, we did not control for these 
covariates in the adjusted models. A separate analysis of these variables using modified 
Poisson regression modeling confirmed that the inclusion of these matching variables as 
control variables had no effect on other variables in the model. Finally, generalized linear 
models estimated the associations between cohort status and estimated log-transformed 
total Medicare expenditures per beneficiary. The statistical analyses were conducted 
using SAS statistical software, version 9.3 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC). Approval from 
the University of South Carolina Institutional Review Board was granted on March 24, 
2016. The study was categorized as “exemption status,” as de-identified secondary data 
was utilized for this study. 
Results  
 Median per capita Medicare expenditures by cohort status are presented in Table 
5.2. Unadjusted bivariate analyses detected significant differences in median per capita 
Medicare expenditures across the four cohorts. Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in 
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the community had the lowest median per capita Medicare expenditures, at $6,987, while 
dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community had the highest, at $12,547. Median 
per capita Medicare expenditures were higher for dual eligible beneficiaries residing in 
long-term care facilities ($10,276) than they were for Medicare-only beneficiaries 
residing in long-term care facilities ($8,953).  
 Characteristics associated with higher median per capita Medicare expenditures 
across all cohorts were a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s or other form of senility and presence 
of two or more chronic conditions. White beneficiaries had significantly higher median 
per capita Medicare expenditures than did non-white or white, Hispanic beneficiaries, but 
only among beneficiaries living in the community.  
 The degree to which beneficiaries fell into the “high cost” Medicare expenditures 
group are presented in Table 5.3. Of note, more than 10% of beneficiaries were “high 
cost” across all groups, which is to be expected given the high level of morbidity 
documented in Table 5.1. The proportion of individuals in the “high cost” group was 
highest among Medicare-only residents of long-term care facilities (31.93%), and lowest 
among Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community (22.17%). Proportion of 
beneficiaries in the “high cost” group were considerably higher among dual eligible 
beneficiaries residing in the community (30.84%) as compared to dual eligible 
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities (26.92%).  
 Rates of presence in the “high cost” group increased with age until age 81, then 
declined, with a high of 31.87% among beneficiaries aged 76-80, and a low of 21.95% 
among beneficiaries aged 91 and older. Both increased chronic condition numbers and 
presence of an Alzheimer’s/senility diagnosis were associated with higher rates of 
76 
 
presence in the “high cost” group in the bivariate analysis. Nearly 46% of residents of 
skilled nursing facilities were in the “high cost” group, while only 12.07% of assisted 
living facility residents were in the “high cost” group.  
Adjusted Risk of Presence in the High Cost Medicare Expenditures Group 
 Multivariate modified Poisson regression modeling estimated the relative risk of 
membership in the “high cost” group of Medicare beneficiaries in our study population. 
In order to better elucidate the effects of the covariates on risk of being in the “high cost” 
group, two analyses were performed: the first analysis included three models examining 
the effects of cohort status, state Medicaid bed-hold policies, and rurality, successively, 
among all four cohorts, (Table 5.4) while the second included four models examining the 
effects of cohort status, state Medicaid bed-hold policies, rurality, and type of residential 
facility, successively, among beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities (Table 
5.5).  
In the first analysis, Model 1 examined the risk of being “high cost” by cohort 
status alone among all four cohorts, and found that the cohort of Medicare-only 
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities had the highest risk (RR 1.19, p<.05) 
when compared to the cohort of dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care 
facilities, followed by the cohort of dual eligible beneficiaries who resided in the 
community (RR 1.15, p <.05). The second and third models, which controlled 
additionally for state bed-hold policies and state bed-hold policies as well as rurality, 
respectively, had very little effect on risk of being “high cost” between the four study 
cohorts, with the third model demonstrating a 19% higher risk for Medicare-only LTC 
facility residents relative to dual eligible LTC facility residents (p <.05), and a 14% 
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higher risk of PPH for dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community compared to 
dual eligible LTC facility residents (p <.05).  
 The second analysis—which compared only the two cohorts representing 
residents of LTC facilities—was similar to Models 1 through 3 in terms of relative risk 
by cohort as well as by each covariate. However, the final model, Model 7, which 
controlled for the additional variable of type of long-term care facility, demonstrated a 
considerably higher relative risk of being “high cost” among Medicare-only LTC facility 
residents relative to dual eligible LTC facility residents (RR 1.33, p <.0001).  This final 
model also showed a significantly higher risk of being “high cost” among residents of 
nursing homes (skilled nursing facilities and nursing facilities), compared to residents of 
assisted living facilities (RR 3.96 for residents of skilled nursing facilities, and RR 2.92 
for residents of nursing facilities, p<.0001).  
Total Expenditures Per Beneficiary 
 We performed two generalized linear models to examine actual Medicare 
expenditures per beneficiary: the first examined log-transformed total Medicare 
expenditures per beneficiary among the four study cohorts, adjusting for bed-hold 
policies and rurality, while the second examined log-transformed total Medicare 
expenditures per beneficiary between only the two cohorts representing residents of LTC 
facilities, controlling for facility type in addition to bed-hold policies and rurality.  In the 
first model, actual total Medicare expenditures per beneficiary were significantly lower 
for Medicare-only beneficiaries (both those who resided in the community, and those 
who resided in residential long-term care facilities) as compared to dual eligible residents 
of long-term care facilities, while urban beneficiaries had higher total Medicare 
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expenditures per beneficiary than did rural beneficiaries. However, in the second model, 
while differences in total Medicare costs by rurality remained significant, differences in 
total expenditures between Medicare-only and dual eligible long-term care residents were 
no longer significant.  
Discussion  
 Our findings suggest that the hypothesis on which this research was based—
namely, that more comprehensive long-term care would have a protective effect on health 
care utilization, and thus Medicare spending—was incorrect.  We found that residents of 
skilled nursing facilities have a nearly four-fold risk of being “high cost” Medicare 
beneficiaries, while residents of nursing facilities have a nearly three-fold risk, compared 
to residents of assisted living facilities. Further research will examine the association 
between type of long-term care facility and health care expenditures. It is likely that 
residents of nursing facilities and skilled nursing facilities are sicker than residents of 
assisted living and custodial care facilities in ways that we were unable to account for in 
our matching methodology. It is also possible that residents of nursing and skilled nursing 
facilities are at a higher risk of exposure to sicker individuals, given the proximity of 
residents to one another and the potential for contagion as medical professionals move 
from patient to patient.  
The results of our study do suggest that dual eligible beneficiaries residing in 
long-term care facilities are less costly to the Medicare system than dual eligible 
beneficiaries residing in the community. Median expenditures among dual eligible 
residents of long-term care facilities were $2,271 lower than median Medicare 
expenditures among dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community—a pattern that 
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is borne out in the results of our Poisson regression analysis, with dual eligible 
beneficiaries residing in the community at a 14% higher risk of being a “high cost” 
Medicare beneficiary than dual eligible residents of long-term care facilities. It is possible 
that, among dual eligible beneficiaries, comprehensiveness of care does indeed play a 
role in preventing high-cost health care utilization. On the other hand, it is also possible 
that total combined Medicare and Medicaid costs are higher for dual eligible beneficiaries 
residing in long-term care facilities than for dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the 
community—it will be important for further research to explore total costs to the system.  
Medicare-only residents of long-term care facilities were found to have a 33% 
higher risk of being a “high cost” Medicare beneficiary than dual eligible residents of 
long-term care facilities, while Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community 
are at an 18% lower risk of being “high cost” than are dual eligible residents of long-term 
care facilities. However, the results of our generalized linear analysis demonstrate that, at 
the median, Medicare-only beneficiaries have lower total Medicare expenditures per 
capita than their dual-eligible counterparts who reside in long-term care facilities. That 
Medicare-only long-term care facility residents have lower total per capita Medicare 
expenditures than their dual eligible long-term care facility resident counterparts, yet are 
at a 33% higher risk of being “high cost” Medicare beneficiaries is an important finding 
that may suggest yet uncovered patterns of higher intensity medical care for Medicare-
only residents of long-term care facilities than for their dual eligible counterparts. Given 
that beneficiaries in each cohort are highly similar, these potential differential treatment 
patterns would not likely be indicative of different levels of acuity. Further research will 
examine what utilization patterns are associated with risks of being high cost, and 
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whether Medicare-only long-term care residents differ in patterns of total Medicare 
utilization from their dual eligible counterparts.  
Limitations  
 This study was limited by our relatively small sample size, which not only 
prevented us from controlling for state of residence—which would have allowed us to 
broadly measure the effects of Medicaid and other long-term care policies specific to 
each state—but also from controlling for regional differences in practice patterns based 
on Hospital Referral Regions. Our sample size of 4,384 also did not provide us with a 
large enough sample to subset race or ethnicity by more than two levels. 
 Our study was also partially limited by our reliance, by necessity, on clinical 
indicators of frailty to match members of the other three cohorts to the dual eligible 
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities. While we did have access to HCPCS 
and CPT codes that indicated home use of oxygen, hospital beds, and mobility devices 
among beneficiaries residing in the community, information as to the utilization of 
oxygen, hospital beds, and mobility devices among beneficiaries residing in long-term 
care facilities was not readily available. Information as to DME use among all cohort 
members would have strengthened our study.  
 Finally, as we had access only to Medicare claims data, we did not have 
information as to the home health or other supportive services paid for privately by either 
Medicare-only or dual-eligible beneficiaries residing in the community.  
Table 5.1: Characteristics of Study Cohorts, 2013 Medicare Claims Files, CMS 
 Medicare 
Only, 
Community-
Dwelling 
Medicare 
Only, LTC 
Resident 
Dual 
Eligible, 
Community 
Dwelling 
Dual 
Eligible, 
LTC 
Resident 
Percentage 
Total 1096 1096 1096 1096 100% 
81 
 
Sex      
Male 346 346 346 346 31.6% 
Female 750 750 750 750 68.4% 
Age Group      
66-70 109 109 109 109 9.9% 
71-75 119 119 119 119 10.9% 
76-80 171 171 171 171 15.6% 
81-85 244 244 244 244 22.3% 
86-90 232 232 232 232 21.2% 
91+ 221 221 221 221 20.2% 
Race      
White, Non-
Hispanic 
943 943 943 943 86.0% 
Non-White, or 
White, Hispanic 
153 153 153 153 14.0% 
Rurality      
Urban 916 916 916 916 83.6% 
Rural 180 180 180 180 16.4% 
Alzheimer’s/Senility      
No 362 362 362 362 33.0% 
Yes 734 734 734 734 67.0% 
Chronic Condition 
Number 
     
0 20 20 20 20 1.8% 
1 126 126 126 126 11.5% 
2+ 950 950 950 950 86.7% 
Bed Hold Policy      
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No  409 (37.3%) 452 
(41.2%) 
323 (29.5%) 358 
(32.7%) 
 
Yes 687 (62.7%) 644 
(58.8%) 
773 (70.5%) 738 
(67.3%) 
 
Type of Long-Term 
Care Facility 
     
None/Community 
Resident 
1096 (100%) 0 1096 (100%) 0  
Assisted Living 0 515 
(47.0%) 
0 132 
(12.0%) 
 
Custodial Care 0 138 
(12.6%) 
0 64 (5.8%)  
Nursing Facility 0 405 
(37.0%) 
0 864 
(78.8%) 
 
Skilled Nursing 
Facility 
0 38 (3.5%) 0 36 (3.3%)  
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       Table 5.2: Median Medicare Expenditures by Cohort, Medicare Claims Files, CMS * = p <.05; ** = p <.0001   
 
 Medicare Only, 
Community-
Dwelling (n = 
1096) 
Medicare Only, 
LTC Resident (n 
= 1096) 
Dual Eligible, 
Community 
Dwelling (n = 
1096) 
Dual Eligible, 
LTC Resident (n 
= 1096) 
P-Value 
(Kruskal-Wallis), 
for cohort 
comparison  
Total (n = 
4,384) 
Total $6,987 $8,953 $12,547 $10,276 <.0001 $9,991 
Sex       
Male $5,649 $8,576 $12,903 $10,123 <.0001 $9,601 
Female $7,547 $9,623 $12,284 $10,297 <.0001 $10,186 
Age Group (d)       
66-70 $5,071 $7,386 $12,282 $14,341** <.0001 $9,469 
71-75 $6,524 $14,136 $13,935 $12,873 0.0037 $11,429 
76-80 $7,886 $9,772 $13,462 $13,452 0.0005 $11,333 
81-85 $7,622 $8,751 $14,370 $11,269 0.0001 $11,040 
86-90 $7,355 $11,328 $12,088 $8,881 0.0023 $9,884 
91+ $6,045 $7,877 $11,001 $6,660 0.0136 $7,781 
Race a, c       
 
 
 
84 
White, Non-
Hispanic 
$7,192* $8,880 $12,836* $10,293 <.0001 $10,267 
Non-White, or 
White, 
Hispanic 
$5,061 $9,622 $9,629 $9,939 <.0001 $8,644 
Rurality b       
Urban $7,314 $10,115* $12,811 $10,083 <.0001 $10,184 
Rural $5,031 $5,688 $11,414 $11,092 <.0001 $9,421 
Alzheimer’s/S
enility a, b, c, 
d  
      
No $4,731** $6,913* $10,264** $9,676* <.0001 $7,748 
Yes $8,874 $11,313 $14,218 $10,581 <.0001 $11,228 
Chronic 
Condition 
Number 
a,b,c,d 
      
0 $1,225** $2,209** $2,720** $4,254** 0.0373 $2,144 
1 $1,909 $2,911 $4,133 $4,184 <.0001 $3,146 
2+ $8,714 $11,437 $14,707 $11,710 <.0001 $11,793 
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Bed Hold 
Policy 
      
No  $7,891 $8,423 $12,585 $10,620 0.0001 $9,911 
Yes $6,577 $9,623 $12,462 $10,168 <.0001 $10,112 
Type of Long-
Term Care 
Facility b 
      
None/Commu
nity Resident 
$6,987 n/a $12,547 n/a <.0001 $10,078 
Assisted 
Living 
n/a $5,951** n/a $10,262 0.0167 $7,331 
Custodial Care n/a $14,277 n/a $11,259 0.0866 $6,972 
Nursing 
Facility 
n/a $10,976 n/a $10,252 0.7238 $17,116 
Skilled 
Nursing 
Facility 
n/a $23,968 n/a $10,343 0.0040 $10,324 
        (a) indicates differences are significant within the Medicare-Only, Community-Dwelling group,  
        (b) indicates differences are significant within the Medicare-Only, LTC Resident group,  
        (c) indicates differences are significant within the Dual Eligible, Community-Dwelling group, and  
        (d) indicates differences are significant within the Dual Eligible, LTC Resident gro
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   Table 5.3. Factors associated with Costs in the 90th Percentile  
    (“High Cost”) Medicare Group, 2013 Medicare Claims File, CMS 
 
 % High Cost p-value 
Cohort    
Medicare Only, Community-
Dwelling 
22.17 <.0001 
Medicare Only, LTC Resident 31.93  
Dual Eligible, Community-
Dwelling 
30.84  
Dual Eligible, LTC Resident  26.92  
Sex   
Male 28.32 0.7195 
Female 27.80  
Age Group   
66-70 27.29 <.0001 
71-75 29.83  
76-80 31.87  
81-85 31.15  
86-90 26.83  
91+ 21.95  
Race   
White, Non-Hispanic 28.26 0.2791 
Non-White, or White, Hispanic 26.14  
Rurality   
Urban 28.25 0.3898 
Rural 26.76  
Alzheimer’s/Senility   
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No 23.07 <.0001 
Yes 30.38  
Chronic Condition Number   
0 3.75 <.0001 
1 7.54  
2+ 31.18  
Bed Hold Policy   
No  28.27 0.7365 
Yes 27.80  
Type of Long-Term Care Facility   
Skilled Nursing Facility   45.70 <.0001 
None (Community) 26.51  
Assisted Living Facility 12.07  
Custodial Care Facility 15.76  
Nursing Facility 31.43  
  
   Table 5.4. Adjusted Relative Risk of Having Medicare Expenditures 
              in the 90th Percentile, All Cohorts, Medicare Claims Files, CMS,  
              *= p <.05; ** = p <.0001 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Cohort     
Medicare Only, Community-
Dwelling 
0.82* 0.82* 0.82* 
Medicare Only, LTC Resident 1.19*  1.18* 1.18* 
Dual Eligible, Community-
Dwelling 
1.15* 1.15* 1.14* 
Dual Eligible, LTC Resident  Ref Ref Ref 
Bed Hold Policy    
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No   Ref Ref 
Yes  0.98 0.98 
Rurality    
Urban   Ref 
Rural   0.95 
 
Table 5.5. Adjusted Relative Risk of Having Medicare Expenditures 
   in the 90th Percentile, Only Residents of LTC Facilities,  
   Medicare Claims Files, CMS, *= p <.05; ** = p <.0001 
 
 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 Model 7  
Cohort      
Medicare Only, LTC Resident 1.19*  1.19* 1.18* 1.33* 
Dual Eligible, LTC Resident  Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Bed Hold Policy     
No   Ref Ref Ref 
Yes  0.99 0.99 1.01 
Rurality     
Urban   Ref Ref 
Rural   0.92 0.87 
     
Facility Type     
Assisted Living    Ref 
Custodial Care    1.29 
Skilled Nursing Facility    3.96** 
Nursing Facility    2.92** 
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Table 5.6. Factors associated with Log-Transformed Total Medicare Expenditures Per 
Capita, All Cohorts 2013 Medicare Claims Files, CMS 
 
Parameter β SE p-value 
Intercept 9.1772 0.06 <.0001 
Cohort Status 
Medicare Only, 
Community-Dwelling 
-0.4537 0.06 <.0001 
Medicare Only, LTC 
Resident 
-0.1376 0.06 0.0146 
Dual Eligible, 
Community-Dwelling 
0.0311 0.06 0.5790 
Dual Eligible, LTC 
Resident  
Ref Ref Ref 
Bed-Hold Policy 
No -0.0031 0.04 0.9410 
Yes Ref Ref Ref 
Rurality 
Urban 0.1413 0.05 0.0055 
Rural Ref Ref Ref  
 
Table 5.7. Factors associated with Log-Transformed Total Medicare Expenditures Per 
Capita, Only Residents of LTC Facilities, 2013 Medicare Claims Files, CMS 
 
Parameter β SE p-value 
Intercept 8.7909 0.12  
Cohort Status 
Medicare Only, LTC 
Resident 
-0.0451 0.06 0.4347 
Dual Eligible, LTC 
Resident  
Ref Ref Ref 
Bed-Hold Policy 
No -0.0406 0.06 0.4746 
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Yes Ref Ref Ref 
Rurality 
Urban 0.1866 0.07 0.0069 
Rural Ref Ref Ref  
Facility Type 
Assisted Living -0.8216 0.14 <.0001 
Custodial Care -0.6010 0.14 <.0001 
Skilled Nursing 
Facility 
Ref Ref Ref 
Nursing Facility -0.2140 0.11 0.0509 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 As the population of elderly Americans continues to increase, the U.S. healthcare 
system will be faced with growing pressure not only to provide medical care that is cost-
effective, but to address issues—such as need for long-term care—that affect health 
services utilization. This original dissertation research examined the interplay between 
place of residence (community versus residential long-term care facility) and long-term 
care payer type (private pay versus Medicaid) on Medicare-funded healthcare utilization 
among elderly Medicare beneficiaries in need of long-term care services and supports. 
 Results presented in manuscripts one and two were based on analyses of 2013 
Medicare claims data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 
obtained from the Research Data Assistance Center (ResDac), merged with data from the 
Area Health Resource File (AHRF). A retrospective cohort analysis was implemented to 
examine differences in rates and risk of potentially preventable hospitalization (PPH), as 
well as differences in Medicare expenditure patterns, between four matched cohorts: 
Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community; Medicare-only beneficiaries 
residing in long-term care facilities; Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries 
residing in the community; and Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in 
long-term care facilities.  
 Regression analysis revealed a significantly higher risk of both PPH and having 
Medicare expenditures in the top 90th percentile among both Medicare-only long-term 
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care facility residents and dual eligible community residents as compared to dual eligible 
long-term care facility residents. However, while there was no statistical difference in 
median per capita Medicare expenditures between dual eligible community residents and 
dual eligible long-term care facility residents, Medicare-only long-term care facility 
residents had significantly lower per capita Medicare expenditures than did their dual 
eligible counterparts residing in long-term care facilities. This finding that Medicare-only 
residents of long-term care facilities are less expensive to the Medicare system, on 
average, than their dual eligible long-term care facility resident peers, yet are more likely 
to be hospitalized for a preventable condition and are more likely to be among the most 
expensive Medicare beneficiaries, could indicate differential patterns of intensity of 
medical response to similar clinical conditions between the two groups. Whether such 
proposed differences in intensity could belie inappropriately low levels of response to 
dual eligible beneficiaries, or inappropriately high levels of response to Medicare-only 
beneficiaries will be the subject of future research.  
 Our study also found, contrary to the results of previous studies, that state 
Medicaid bed hold policies had no statistically significant effect on either risk of PPH or 
on Medicare expenditures. Indeed, the results of this study seem to indicate that perverse 
incentives that have been suggested by a number of researchers to encourage 
overutilization of Medicare-funded services for dual eligible beneficiaries—particularly 
those dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities—may not play as 
large of a role in Medicare-funded health system utilization, and that, in fact, some other 
factor—or set of factors—encourages higher utilization among Medicare-only residents 
of long-term care facilities. Further research will examine specific types of utilization of 
 
93 
 
Medicare-funded health care, with a specific focus on types of PPH associated with 
higher costs of care, and differences in patterns of these types of PPH between Medicare-
only and dual eligible long-term care facility residents.  
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